TRAINS OF REASONING. 



139 



the simple case, seen to resemble them 

 in material points, but inferred to do 

 so, because resembling them in some- 

 thing else, which we have been led 

 by quite a different set of instances to 

 consider as a mark of the former re- 

 semblance. 



This first example of a train of 

 reasoning is still extremely simple, 

 the series consisting of only two syl- 

 logisms. The following is somewhat 

 more complicated : — No government, 

 which earnestly seeks the good of its 

 subjects is likely to be overthrown ; 

 some particular government earnestly 

 seeks the good of its subjects, there- 

 fore it is not likely to be overthrown. 

 The major premise in this argument 

 we shall suppose not to be derived 

 from considerations a priori, but to 

 be a generalisation from history, 

 which, whether correct or erroneous, 

 must have been founded on observa- 

 tion of governments concerning whose 

 desire of the good of their subjects 

 there was no doubt. It has been 

 found, or thought to be found, that 

 these were not easily overthrown, and 

 it has been deemed that those in- 

 stances warranted au extension of the 

 same predicate to any and every 

 government which resembles them in 

 the attribute of desiring earnestly the 

 good of its subjects. But does the 

 government in question thus resemble 

 them ? This may be debated pro and 

 con by many arguments, and must, in 

 any case, be proved by another induc- 

 tion ; for we cannot directly observe 

 the sentiments and desires of the per- 

 sons who carry on the government. 

 To prove the minor, therefore, we 

 require an argument in this form : 

 Every government which acts in a 

 certain manner desires the good of 

 its subjects : the supposed govern- 

 ment acts in that particular manner, 

 therefore it desires the good of its 

 subjects. But is it true that the 

 government acts in the manner sup- 

 posed ? This minor also may require 

 proof ; still another induction, as 

 thus : — What is asserted by intelli- 

 gent and disinterested witnesses may 



be believed to be true ; that the go- 

 vernment acts in this manner is as- 

 serted by such witnesses, therefore it 

 may be believed to be true. The argu- 

 ment hence consists of three steps. 

 Having the evidence of our senses 

 that the case of the government under 

 consideration resembles a number of 

 former cases, in the circumstance of 

 having something asserted respecting 

 it by intelligent and disinterested wit- 

 nesses, we infer, first, that, as in those 

 former instances, so in this instance, 

 the assertion is true. Secondly, what 

 was asserted of the government being 

 that it acts in a particular manner, 

 and other governments or persons 

 having been observed to act in the 

 same manner, the government in ques- 

 tion is brought into known resem- 

 blance with those other governments 

 or persons ; and since they were 

 known to desire the good of the people, 

 it is thereupon, by a second induction, 

 inferred that the particular govern- 

 ment spoken of desires the good of 

 the people. This brings that govern- 

 ment into known resemblance with 

 the other governments which were 

 thought likely to escape revolution, 

 and thence, by a third induction, it is 

 concluded that this particular govern- 

 ment is also likely to escape. This 

 is still reasoning from particulars to 

 particulars, but we now reason to the 

 new instance from three distinct sets 

 of former instances : to one only of 

 those sets of instances do we directly 

 perceive the new one to be similar ; 

 but from that similarity we induc- 

 tively infer that it has the attribute 

 by which it is assimilated to the next 

 set, and brought within the corre- 

 sponding induction ; after which by 

 a repetition of the same operation we 

 infer it to be similar to the third set, 

 and hence a third induction conducts 

 us to the ultimate conclusion. 



§ 3. Notwithstanding the superior 

 complication of these examples, com- 

 pared with those by which in the pre- 

 ceding chapter we illustrated the 

 general theory of reasoning, every 



