THEORIES CONCERNING AXIOMS. 



179 



ing as believable. But of what con- 

 sequence is it what we apprehend at 

 the moment, if the moment is in con- 

 tradiction to the permanent state of 

 our mind? A person who has been 

 frightened when an infant by stories 

 of ghosts, though he disbelieves them 

 in after years, (and perhaps never be- 

 lieved them,) may be unable all his 

 life to be in a dark place, in circum- 

 stances stimulating to the imagination, 

 without mental discomposure. The 

 idea of ghosts, with all its attendant 

 terrors, is irresistibly called up in his 

 mind by the outward circumstances. 

 Mr. Spencer may say, that while he 

 is under the influence of this terror he 

 does not disbelieve in ghosts, but has 

 a temporary and uncontrollable belief 

 in them. Be it so ; but allowing it 

 to be so, which would it be truest to 

 say of this man on the whole — that 

 he believes in ghosts, or that he does 

 not believe in them ? Assuredly that 

 he does not believe in them. The 

 case is similar with those who dis- 

 believe a material world. Though 

 they cannot get rid of the idea ; 

 though while looking at a solid object 

 they cannot help having the concep- 

 tion, and therefore, according to Mr. 

 Spencers metaphysics, the momentary 

 belief, of its externality ; even at that 

 moment they would sincerely deny 

 holding that belief : and it would be 

 incorrect to call them other than dis- 

 believers of the doctrine. The belief, 

 therefore, is not invariable ; and the 

 test of inconceivableness fails in the 

 only cases to which there could ever 

 be any occasion to apply it. 



That a thing may be perfectly be- 

 lievable, and yet may not have be- 

 come conceivable, and that we may 

 habitually believe one side of an alter- 

 native, and conceive only in the other, 

 is familiarly exemplified in the state 

 of mind of educated persons respect- 

 ing sunrise and sunset. All educated 

 persons either know by investigation, 

 or believe on the authority of science, 

 that it is the earth and not the sun 

 which moves : but there are probably 

 few who habitually conceive the pheno- 



menon otherwise than as the ascent 

 or descent of the sun. Assuredly no 

 one can do so without a prolonged 

 trial ; and it is probably not easier 

 now than in the first generation after 

 Copernicus. Mr. Spencer does not 

 say, " In looking at sunrise it is im- 

 possible not to conceive that it is the 

 sun which moves, therefore this is 

 what everybody believes, and we have 

 all the evidence for it that we can 

 have for any truth." Yet this would 

 be an exact parallel to his doctrine 

 about the belief in matter. 



The existence of matter, and other 

 Noumena, as distinguished from the 

 phenomenal world, remains a question 

 of argument, as it was before ; and 

 the very general, but neither necessary 

 nor universal, belief in them.s tands 

 as a psychological phenomenon to be 

 explained, either on the hypothesis 

 of its truth, or on some other. The 

 belief is not a conclusive proof of its 

 own truth, unless there are no such 

 things as idola tribds ; but being a 

 fact, it calls on antagonists to show, 

 from what except the real existence 

 of the thing believed, so general and 

 apparently spontaneous a belief can 

 have originated. And its opponents 

 have never hesitated to accept this 

 challenge.* The amount of their 

 success in meeting it will probably 

 determine the ultimate verdict of 

 philosophers on the question. 



§ 4. In a revision, or rather recon- 

 struction of his "Principles of Psy- 

 chology," as one of the stages or plat- 

 forms in the imposing structure of his 

 System of Philosophy, Mr. Spencer 

 has resumed what he justly terms f 

 the '* amicable controversy that has 

 been long pending between us ; " ex- 

 pressing at the same time a regret, 

 which I cordially share, that "this 

 lengthened exposition of a single point 

 of difference, unaccompanied by an 



* I have myself accepted the contest, and 

 fought it out on this battle-ground, in the 

 eleventh chapter of An Examination 0/ Sir 

 William Hamilton't Philosophy. 



t Chap. xi. 



