l8o 



REASONING. 



exposition of the numerous points of 

 concurrence, unavoidably produces an 

 appearance of dissent very far greater 

 than that which exists." I l^lieve, 

 with Mr. Spencer, that the difference 

 between us, if measured by our con- 

 clusions, is "superficial rather than 

 substantial ; " and the value I attach 

 to so great an amount of agreement, 

 in the field of analytic psychology, 

 with a thinker of his force and depth, 

 is such as I can hardly overstate. But 

 I also agree with him that the differ- 

 ence which exists in our premises is 

 one of *' profound importance, philo- 

 sophically considered ; " and not to 

 be dismissed while any part of the 

 case of either of us has not been fully 

 examined and discussed. 



In his present statement of the 

 Universal Postulate, Mr. Spencer has 

 exchanged his former expression, 

 " beliefs which invariably exist, " for 

 the following : " cognitions of which 

 the predicates invariably exist along 

 with their subjects." And he says 

 that "an abortive effort to conceive 

 the negation of a proposition, shows 

 that the cognition expressed is one of 

 which the predicate invariably exists 

 along with its subject ; and the dis- 

 covery that the predicate invariably 

 exists along with its subject is the 

 discovery that this cognition is one we 

 are compelled to accept." Both these 

 premises of Mr. Spencer's syllogism I 

 am able to assent to, but in different 

 senses of the middle term. If the 

 invariable existence of the predicate 

 along with its subject is to be under- 

 stood in the most obvious meaning, 

 as an existence in actual Nature, or in 

 other words, in our objective or sen- 

 sational experience, I of course admit 

 that this, once ascertained, compels us 

 to accept the proposition : but then I 

 do not admit that the failure of an 

 attempt to conceive the negative 

 proves the predicate to be always co- 

 existent with the subject in actual 

 Nature. If, on the other hand, (which 

 I believe to be Mr. Spencer's mean- 

 ing,) the invariable existence of the 

 predicate along with the subject is to 



be understood only of our concept! ve 

 faculty, i.e. that the one is inseparable 

 from the other in our thoughts ; then, 

 indeed, the inability to separate the 

 two ideas proves their inseparable con- 

 junction, here and now in the mind 

 which has failed in the attempt ; but 

 this inseparability in thought does not 

 prove a corresponding inseparability 

 in fact, nor even in the thoughts of 

 other people, or of the same person in 

 a possible future. 



" That some propositions have been 

 wrongly accepted as true, because 

 their negations were supposed incon- 

 ceivable when they were not," does 

 not, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, "dis- 

 prove the validity of the test ; " not 

 only because any test whatever "is 

 liable to yield untrue results, either 

 from incapacity or from carelessness 

 in those who use it," but because the 

 propositions in question " were com- 

 plex propositions, not to be established 

 by a test applicable to propositions no 

 further decomposable. " " A test legi- 

 timately applicable to a simple pro- 

 position the subject and predicate of 

 which are in direct relation, cannot 

 be legitimately applied to a complex 

 proposition, the subject and predicate 

 of which are indirectly related through 

 the many simple propositions implied." 

 " That things which are equal to the 

 same thing are equal to one another, 

 is a fact which can be known by direct 

 comparison of actual or ideal relations. 

 . . . . But that the square of the 

 hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle 

 equals the sum of the squares of the 

 other two sides, cannot be known 

 immediately by comparison of two 

 states of consciousness : here the 

 truth can be reached only mediately, 

 through a series of simple judgments 

 respecting the likenesses or unlike - 

 nesses of certain relations." More- 

 over, even when the proposition admits 

 of being tested by immediate con- 

 sciousness, people often neglect to do 

 it. A schoolboy, in adding up a 

 column of figures, will say " 35 and 

 9 are 46," though this is contrary to 

 the verdict which consciousness gives 



