BOOK HI. 



OF INDUCTION. 



*• According to the doctrine now stated, the highest, or rather the only proper object 

 of physics, is to ascertain those established conjunctions of successive events, which 

 constitute the order of the universe ; to record the phenomena which it exhibits to our 

 observation or which it discloses to our experiments ; and to refer these phenomena to 

 their general laws. "— D. Stewart, EUnunts of the Philoio^y of the human Mind, vol. ii. 

 chap. iv. sect. i. 



CHAPTER L 



PKELIMINAKY OBSERVATIONS ON IN- 

 DUCTION IN GENERAL. 



§ I. The portion of the present in- 

 quiry upon which we are now about 

 to enter may be considered as the 

 principal, both from its surpassing in 

 intricacy all the other branches, and 

 tecause it relates to a process which 

 has been shown in the preceding 

 Book to be that in which the inves- 

 tigation of nature essentially consists. 

 We have found that all Inference, 

 consequently all Proof, and all dis- 

 covery of truths not self-evident, con- 

 sists of inductions, and the interpre- 

 tation of inductions ; that all our 

 knowledge, not intuitive, comes to 

 us exclusively from that source. What 

 Induction is, therefore, and what con- 

 ditions render it legitimate, cannot 

 but be deemed the main question of 

 the science of logic — the question 

 which includes all othere. It is, 

 however, one which professed writers 

 on logic have almost entirely pa.ssed 

 ever. The generalities of the subject I 



have not been altogether neglected by 

 metaphysicians ; but, for want of suf- 

 ficient acquaintance with the processes 

 by which science has actually suc- 

 ceeded in establishing general truths, 

 their analysis of the inductive opera- 

 tion, even when unexceptionable as 

 to correctness, has not been specific 

 enough to be made the foundation of 

 practical rules, which might be for in- 

 duction itself what the rules of the 

 syllogism are for the interpretation 

 of induction ; while those by whom 

 physical science has been carried to 

 its present state of improvement— 

 and who, to arrive at a complete 

 theory of the process, needed only to 

 generalise, and adapt to all varieties 

 of problems, the methods which they 

 themselves employed in their habitual 

 pursuits — never until very lately made 

 any serious attempt to philosophise on 

 the subject, nor regarded the mode in 

 which they arrived at their conclusions 

 as deserving of study, independently 

 of the conclusions themselves. 



§ 2. For the purposes of the present 



