ao2 



INDtTCTION. 



remarks, every induction is a syllogism 

 with the major premise suppressed ; 

 or (as I prefer expressing it) every 

 induction may be thrown into the 

 form of a syllogism by supplying a 

 major premise. If this be actually 

 done, the principle which we are now 

 considering, that of the uniformity of 

 the course of nature, will appear as 

 the ultimate major premise of all in- 

 ductions, and will, therefore, stand to 

 all inductions in the relation in which, 

 as has been shown at so much length, 

 the major proposition of a syllogism 

 always stands to the conclusion ; not 

 contributing at all to prove it, but 

 being a necessary condition of its 

 being proved ; since no conclusion is 

 proved for which there cannot be 

 found a true major premise.* 



* In the first edition a note was appended 

 at this place, containing some criticism on 

 Archbishop Whately's mode of conceiving 

 the relation between Syllogism and Induc- 

 tion. In a subsequent issue of his Logic, 

 the Archbishop made a reply to the criti- 

 cism, which induced me to cancel part of 

 the note, incorporating tlie remainder in 

 the text. In a still later edition, the Arch- 

 bishop observes in a tone of something 

 like disapprobation, that the objections, 

 "doubtless from their being fully answered 

 and found untenable, were silently sup- 

 pressed," and that hence he might appear 

 to some of his readers to be combating a 

 shadow. On this latter point, the Arch- 

 bishop need give himself no uneasiness. 

 His readers, I make bold to say, will fully 

 credit his mere afl&rmation that the objec- 

 tions have actually been made. 



But as he seems to think that what he 

 terms the suppression of the objections 

 ought not to have been made "silently," I 

 now break that silence, and state exactly 

 what it is that I suppressed, and why. I 

 suppressed that alone which might be re- 

 garded as personal criticism on the Arch- 

 bishop. I had imputed to him the having 

 omitted to ask himself a particular ques- 

 tion. I found that he had asked himself 

 the question, and could give it an answer 

 consistent with his own theory. I had 

 also, within the compass of a parenthesis, 

 hazarded some remarks on certain general 

 characteristics of Archbishop Whately as a 

 philosopher. These remarks, though their 

 tone, I hope, was neither disrespectful nor 

 arrogant, I felt, on reconsideration, that I 

 was hardly entitled to make ; least of all, 

 when the instance which I had regarded 

 as an illustration of them failed, as I now 

 ■aw, to bear them out. The real matter at 

 the bottom of the whole dispute, tho dif- 



The statement that the uniformity 

 of the course of nature is the ultimate 

 major premise in all cases of induc- 

 tion may be thought to require some 

 explanation. The immediate major 

 premise in every inductive argument 

 it certainly is not. Of that Arch- 

 bishop Whately's must be held to be 

 the correct account. The induction, 

 "John, Peter, &c., are mortal, there- 

 fore all mankind are mortal," may, as 

 he justly says, be thrown into a syl- 

 logism by prefixing asa major premise, 

 {what is at any rate a necessary con- 

 dition of the validity of the argument,) 

 namely, that what is true of John, 

 Peter, &c., is true of all mankind. 

 But how came we by this major pre- 

 mise ? It is not self-evident ; nay, in 

 all cases of unwarranted generalisation 

 it is not true. How, then, is it arrived 

 at ? Necessarily either by induction 

 or ratiocination ; and if by induction, 

 the process, like all other inductive 

 arguments, may be thrown into the 

 form of a syllogism. This previous 

 syllogism it is, therefore, necessary to 

 construct. There is, in the long-run, 

 only one possible construction. The 

 real proof that what is true of John, 

 Peter, &c., is true of all mankind, can 

 only be, that a different supposition 

 would be inconsistent with the uni- 

 formity which we know to exist in 

 the course of nature. Whether there 

 would be this inconsistency or not, 

 may be a matter of long and delicate 

 inquiry ; but unless there would, we 



ferent view we take of the function of the 

 major premise, remains exactly where it 

 was ; and so far was I from thinking that 

 my opinion had been fully "answered" 

 and was "untenable," that in the same 

 edition in which I cancelled the note, I 

 not only enforced the opinion by further 

 arguments, but answered (though without 

 naming him) those of the Archbishop. 



For not having made this statement be- 

 fore, I do not think it needful to apologise. 

 It would be attaching very great import- 

 ance to one's smallest sayings to think a 

 formal retraction requisite every time that 

 one falls into an error. Nor is Archbishop 

 Whately's well-earned fame of so tender a 

 quality as to require that in withdrawing 

 a slight criticism on him I should have 

 been bound to offer a public amende for 

 having made it. 



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