GROUND OF INDUCTION. 



^ 



have no sufficient ground for the major 

 of the inductive syllogism. It hence 

 appears, that if we throw the whole 

 course of any inductive argument into 

 a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive 

 by more or fewer steps at an ultimate 

 syllogism, which will havefor its major 

 premise the principle or axiom of the 

 uniformity of the course of nature.* 



It was not to be expected that in 

 the case of this axiom, any more than 

 of other axioms, there should be unani- 

 mity among thinkers Avith respect 

 to the ground on which it is to be 

 received as true. I have already 

 stated that I regard it as itself a gene- 

 ralisation from experience. Others 

 hold it to be a principle which, ante- 

 cedently to any verification by experi- 

 ence, we are compelled by the con- 

 stittition of our thinking faculty to 

 assume as true. Having so recently, 

 and at so much length, combated a 

 similar doctrine as applied to the 

 axioms of mathematics by arguments 

 which are in a great measure appli- 



* But though it is a condition of the 

 validity of every induction that there be 

 xiniforniity in the course of nature, it is 

 not a necessary condition that the uni- 

 formity should pervade all nature. It is 

 enough that it pervades the particular 

 class of phenomena to which the induction 

 relates. An induction concerning the 

 motions of the planets, or the properties 

 of the magnet, would not be vitiated 

 though we were to suppose that wind and 

 weather are the sport of chance, provided 

 it be assumed that astronomical and mag- 

 netic phenomena are under the dominion of 

 general laws. Otherwise the early experi- 

 ence of mankind would have rested on a 

 very weak fovmdation ; for in the infancy 

 of science it could not be known that all 

 phenomena are regular in their course. 



Neither would it be correct to say that 

 every induction by which we infer any 

 truth implies the general fact of unifor- 

 mity as foreknown, even in reference to 

 the kind of phenomena concerned. It im- 

 plies, either that this general fact is already 

 known, oi- that we may now know it : as 

 the conclusion, the Duke of Wellington is 

 mortal, drawn from the instances A, B, 

 and C, implies either that we have already 

 concluded all men to be mortal, or that we 

 are now entitled to do so from the same 

 evidence. A vast amoimt of confusion 

 .•md paralogism respecting the grounds of 

 Induction would be dispelled by keeping 

 in view these simple considerations. 



cable to the present case, 1 shall defer 

 the more particular discussion of this 

 controverted point in regard to the 

 fundamental axiom of induction un- 

 til a more advanced period of our 

 inquiry.* At present, it is of more 

 importance to understand thoroughly 

 the import of the axiom itself. For 

 the proposition, that the course of 

 nature is uniform, possesses rather the 

 brevity suitable to popular, than the 

 precision requisite in philosophical 

 language : its terms require to be ex- 

 plained, and a stricter than their 

 ordinary signification given to them, 

 before the truth of the assertion can 

 be admitted. 



§ 2. Every person's consciousness 

 as-sures him that he does not always 

 expect uniformity in the course of 

 events ; he does not always believe 

 that the unknown will be similar to 

 the known, that the future will re- 

 semble the past. Nobody believes 

 that the succession of rain and fine 

 weather will be the same in every 

 future year as in the present. No- 

 body expects to have the same dreams 

 repeated every night. On the con- 

 trary, everybody mentions it as some- 

 thing extraordinary if the course of 

 nature is constant, and resembles it- 

 self in these particulars. To look 

 for constancy where constancy is not 

 to be expeoted, as, for instance, that a 

 j day which has once brought good 

 j fortune will always be a fortunate 

 day, is justly accounted superstition. 

 The course of nature, in truth, is 

 not only uniform, it is also infinitely 

 various. Some phenomena are always 

 seen to recur in the very same com- 

 binations in which we met with them 

 at first ; others seem altogether capri- 

 cious ; while some, which we had been 

 accustomed to regard as bound down 

 exclusively to a particular set of com- 

 binations, we unexpectedly find de- 

 tached from some of the elements with 

 which we had hitherto found them 

 conjoined, and united to others of 



* lofra, chap. zzl. 



