214 



INDUCTION. 



to exist, it was preceded by some fact 

 or facts with which it is invariably 

 connected. For every event there 

 exists some combination of objects or 

 events, some given concurrence of 

 circumstances, positive and negative, 

 the occurrence of which is always fol- 

 lowed by that phenomenon. We 

 may not have found out what this 

 concurrence of circumstances may be; 

 but we never doubt that there is such 

 a one, and that it never occurs with- 

 out having thephenomenon in question 

 as its effect or consequence. On the 

 universality of this truth depends the 

 possibility of reducing the inductive 

 process to rules. The undoubted as- 

 surance we have that there is a law to 

 be found if we only knew how to find 

 it, will be seen presently to be the 

 source from which the canons of the 

 Inductive Logic derive their validity. 



§ 3. It is seldom, if ever, between 

 a consequent and a single antecedent 

 that this invariable sequence subsists. 

 It is usually between a consequent 

 and the sum of several antecedents ; 

 the concurrence of all of them being 

 requisite to produce, that is, to be 

 certain of being followed by, the con- 

 sequent. In such cases it is very com- 

 mon to single out one only of the ante- 

 cedents under the denomination of 

 Cause, calling the others merely Con- 

 ditions. Thus, if a person eats of a 

 particulardish,anddiesinconsequence, 

 that is, would not have died if he had 

 not eaten of it, people would be apt to 

 say that eating of that dish was the 

 cause of his death. There needs not, 

 however, be any invariable connection 

 between eating of the dish and death ; 

 but there certainly is, among the cir- 

 cumstances which took place, some 

 combination or other on which death 

 is invariably consequent : as, for in- 

 stance, the act of eating of the dish, 

 combined with a particular bodily 

 constitution, a particular state of pre- 

 sent health, and perhaps even a certain 

 state of the atmosphere ; the whole of 

 which circumstances perhaps consti- 

 tuted in this particular case the con- 



ditions of the phenomenon, or, m othei* 

 words, the set of antecedents which 

 determined it, and but for which it 

 would not have happened. The real 

 Cause is the whole of these antece- 

 dents ; and we have, philosophically 

 speaking, no right to give the name of 

 cause to one of them exclusively of 

 the others. What, in the case we have 

 supposed, disguises the incorrectness 

 of the expression is this : that the 

 various conditions, except the single 

 one of eating the food, were not events 

 (that is, instantaneous changes, or suc- 

 cessions of instantaneous changes) but 

 states possessing more or less of per- 

 manency ; and might therefore have 

 preceded the effect by an indefinite 

 length of duration, for want of the 

 event which was requisite to complete 

 the required concurrence of condi- 

 tions : while as soon as that event, 

 eating the food, occurs, no other cause 

 is waited for, but the effect begins im- 

 mediately to take place ; and hence 

 the appearance is presented of a 

 more immediate and close connection 

 between the effect and that one ante- 

 cedent, than between the effect and 

 the remaining conditions. Butthough 

 we may think proper to give the name 

 of cause to that one condition, the ful- 

 filment of which completes the tale, 

 and brings about the effect without 

 further delay ; this condition has really 

 no closer relation to the effect than 

 any of the other conditions has. All 

 the conditions were equally indispens- 

 able to the production of the conse- 

 quent ; and the statement of the cause 

 is incomplete, unless in some shape or 

 other we introduce them alL A man 

 takes mercury, goes out of doors, and 

 catches cold. We say, perhaps, that 

 the cause of his taking cold was ex- 

 posure to the air. It is clear, how- 

 ever, that his having taken mercury 

 may have been a necessary condition 

 of his catching cold ; and though it 

 might consist with usage to say that 

 the cause of his attack was exposure 

 to the air, to be accurate we ought to 

 say that the cause was exposure to the 

 air while under the effect of mercury. 



