LAW OF CAUSATION. 



233 



been no night, and that if the sun 

 were always below the horizon there 

 would be night, though there had 

 been no day. We thus know from 

 experience that the succession of night 

 and day is not unconditional. Let 

 me add, that the antecedent, which 

 is only conditionally invariable, is not 

 the invariable antecedent. Though a 

 fact may, in experience, have always 

 been followed by another fact, yet 

 if the remainder of our experience 

 teaches us that it might not always 

 be so followed, or if the experience 

 itself is such as leaves room for a 

 possibility that the known cases may 

 not correctly represent all possible 

 cases, the hitherto invariable ante- 

 cedent is not accounted the cause ; 

 but why ? Because we are not sure 

 that it is the invariable antecedent. 



Such cases of sequence as that of 

 day and night not only do not con- 

 tradict the doctrine which resolves 

 causation into invariable sequence, 

 but are necessarily implied in that 

 doctrine. It is evident, that from 

 a limited number of unconditional 

 sequences, there will result a much 

 greater number of conditional ones. 

 Certain causes being given, that is, 

 certain antecedents which are uncon- 

 ditionally followed by certain conse- 

 quents, the mere co-existence of these 

 causes will give rise to an unlimited 

 number of additional uniformities. If 

 two causes exist together, the effects 

 of both will exist together ; and if 

 many causes co-exist, these causes (by 

 what we shall term hereafter the in- 

 termixture of their laws) will give rise 

 to new effects, accompanying or suc- 

 ceeding one another in some particular 

 order, which order will be invariable 

 while the causes continue to co-exist, 

 but no longer. The motion of the 

 earth in a given orbit round the sun 

 is a series of changes which follow 

 one another as antecedent and conse- 

 quents, and will continue to do so 

 while the sun's attraction, and the 

 force with which the earth tends to 

 advance in a direct line through space, 

 continue to co-exist in the same quan- 



tities as at present. But vary either 

 of these causes, and this particular 

 succession of motions would cease to 

 take place. The series of the earth's 

 motions therefore, though a case of 

 sequence invariable within the limits 

 of human experience, is not a case of 

 causation. It is not unconditional. 



This distinction between the rela- 

 tions of succession which, so far as we 

 know, are unconditional, and those 

 relations, whether of succession or of 

 co-existence, which, like the earth's 

 motions or the succession of day and 

 night, depend on the existence or on 

 the co-existence of other antecedent 

 facts, corresponds to the great divi- 

 sion which Dr. Whewell and other 

 writers have made of the field of 

 science into the investigation of what 

 they term the Laws of Phenomena 

 and the investigation of causes ; a 

 phraseology, as I conceive, not philo- 

 sophically sustainable, inasmuch as 

 the ascertainment of causes, such 

 causes as the human faculties can 

 ascertain, namely, causes which are 

 themselves phenomena, is, therefore, 

 merely the ascertainment of other and 

 more universal Laws of Phenomena. 

 Ar I let me here observe, that Dr. 

 Whewell, and in some degree even 

 Sir John Herschel, seem to have 

 misunderstood the meaning of those 

 writers who, like M. Comte, limit 

 the sphere of scientific investigation 

 to Laws of Phenomena, and speak of 

 the inquiry into causes as vain and 

 futile. The causes which M. Cocnte 

 designates as inaccessible are efficient 

 causes. The investigation of physical, 

 as opposed to efficient, causes (includ- 

 ing the study of all the active forces 

 in Nature, considered as facts of ob- 

 j servation) is as important a part of 

 I M. Comte's conception of science as 

 of Dr. Whewell's. His objection to 

 the ivord cause is a mere matter of 

 nomenclature, in which, as a matter 

 of nomenclature, I consider him to be 

 entirely wrong. "Those," it is justly 

 remarked by Mr. Bailey,* " who, like 



* Letters on the Philosophy of the Human 

 Mind, First Series, p. 219. . 



