224 



INDUCTION. 



M. Comte, object to designate events 

 as causes, are objecting without any 

 real ground to a mere but extremely 

 convenient generalisation, to a very 

 useful common name, the employment 

 of which involves, or needs involve, 

 no particular theory." To which it 

 may be added, that by rejecting this 

 form of expression, M. Comte leaves 

 himself without any term for marking 

 a distinction which, however incor- 

 rectly expressed, is not only real, but 

 is one of the fundamental distinctions 

 in science ; indeed, it is on this alone, 

 as we shall hereafter find, that the 

 possibility rests of framing a rigorous 

 Canon of Induction. And as things 

 left without a name are apt to be for- 

 gotten, a Canon of that description is 

 not one of the many benefits which 

 the philosophy of Induction has re 

 ceived from M. Comte's great powers. 



§ 7. Does a cause always stand with 

 its effect in the relation of antecedent 

 and consequent? Do we not often 

 say of two simultaneous facts that 

 they are cause and effect — as when 

 we say that fire is the cause of warmth, 

 the sun and moisture the cause of 

 vegetation, and the like? Since a 

 cause does not necessarily perish be- 

 cause its effect has been produced, 

 the two things do very generally co- 

 exist ; and there are some appearances, 

 and some common expressions, seem- 

 ing to imply not only that causes may, 

 but that they must, be contempo- 

 raneous with their effects, Cessante 

 causd cessat et effectus has been a dogma 

 of the schools : the necessity for the 

 continued existence of the cause in 

 order to the continuance of the effect, 

 seems to have been once a generally 

 received doctrine. Kepler's numerous 

 attempts to account for the motions 

 of the heavenly bodies on mechanical 

 principles were rendered abortive by 

 his always supposing that the agency 

 which set those bodies in motion must 

 continue to operate in order to keep 

 up the motion which it at first pro- 

 duced. Yet there were at all times 

 many familiar instances of the con- 



tinuance of effects long after their 

 causes had ceased. A coup de soleil 

 gives a person brain-fever: will the 

 fever go off as soon as he is moved 

 out of the sunshine ? A sword is run 

 through his body : must the sword 

 remain in his body in order that he 

 may continue dead ? A ploughshare 

 once made, remains a ploughshare, 

 without any continuance of heating 

 and hammering, and even after the 

 man who heated and hammered it 

 has been gathered to his fathers. On 

 the other hand, the pressure which 

 forces up the mercury in an exhausted 

 tube must be continued in order to 

 sustain it in the tube. This (it may 

 be replied) is because another force is 

 acting without intermission, the force 

 of gravity, which would restore it to 

 its level, unless counterpoised by a 

 force equally constant. But again : 

 a tight bandage causes pain, which 

 pain will sometimes go off as soon as 

 the bandage is removed. The illumi- 

 nation which the sun diffuses over the 

 earth ceases when the sun goes down. 

 There is, therefore, a distinction to 

 be drawn. The conditions which are 

 necessary for the first production of 

 a phenomenon are occasionally also 

 necessary for its continuance ; though 

 more commonly its continuance re- 

 quires no condition except negative 

 ones. Most things, once produced, 

 continue as they are, until something 

 changes or destroys them ; but some 

 require the permanent presence of 

 the agencies which produced them at 

 first. These may, if we please, be 

 considered as instantaneous pheno- 

 mena, requiring to be renewed at each 

 instant by the cause by which they 

 were at first generated. Accordingly, 

 the illumination of any given point of 

 space has always been looked upon as 

 an instantaneous fact, which perishes 

 and is perpetually renewed as long as 

 the necessary conditions subsist. If 

 we adopt this language we avoid the 

 necessity of admitting that the con- 

 tinuance of the cause is ever required 

 to maintain the effect. We may say, 

 it is not required to maintain, but to 



