232 



INDUCTION. 



comitance, the expenditure or transfer 

 of energy. If the effect, or any part 

 of the effect, to be accounted for, con- 

 sists in putting matter in motion, then 

 any of the objects present which has 

 lost motion has contributed to the 

 effect ; and this is the true meaning 

 of the proposition that the cause is 

 that one of the antecedents which 

 exerts active force. 



§ II. It is proper in this place to 

 advert to a rather ancient doctrine re- 

 specting causation, which has been re- 

 vived during the last few years in 

 many quarters, and at present gives 

 more signs of life than any other 

 theory of causation at variance with 

 that set forth in the preceding pages. 



According to the theory in question, 

 Mind, or, to speak more precisely, Will 

 is the only cause of phenomena. The 

 type of Causation, as well as the ex- 

 clusive source from which we derive 

 the idea, is our own voluntary agency. 

 Here, and here only (it is said) we 

 have direct evidence of causation. We 

 know that we can move our bodies. 

 Respecting the phenomena of inani- 

 mate nature, we have no other direct 

 knowledge than that of antecedence 

 and sequence. But in the case of our 

 voluntary actions, it is affirmed that 

 we are conscious of power before we 

 have experience of results. An act 

 of volition, whether followed by an 

 effect or not, is accompanied by a con- 

 sciousness of effort, " of force exerted, 

 of power in action, which is necessarily 

 causal or causative." This feeling of 

 energy or force inherent in an act of 

 will is knowledge ci pj'ioi'i ; assurance 

 prior to experience that we have the 

 power of causing effects. Volition, 

 therefore, it is asserted, is something 

 more than an unconditional antece- 

 dent ; it is a cause in a different sense 

 from that in which physical pheno- 

 mena are said to cause one another : 

 it is an Efficient Cause. From this 

 the transition is easy to the further 

 doctrine, that Volition is the sole 

 Efficient Cause of all phenomena. 

 ** It is inconceivable that dead force 



could continue unsupported for a mo- 

 ment beyond its creation. We can- 

 not even conceive of change of pheno- 

 mena without the energy of a mind." 

 " The word action " itself, says another 

 writer of the same school, "has no 

 real significance except when applied 

 to the doings of an intelligent agent. 

 Let any one conceive, if he can, of 

 any power, energy, or force, inherent 

 in a lump of matter." Phenomena 

 may have the semblance of being pro- 

 duced by physical causes, but they 

 are in reality produced, say these 

 writers, by the immediate agency of 

 mind. All things which do not pro- 

 ceed from a human (or, I suppose, an 

 animal) will, proceed, they say, 

 directly from divine will. The earth 

 is not moved by the combination of a 

 centripetal and a projectile force ; 

 this is but a mode of speaking, which 

 serves to facilitate our conceptions. 

 It is moved by the direct volition of 

 an Omnipotent Being, in a path coin- 

 ciding with that which we deduce 

 from the hypothesis of these two 

 forces. 



As I have so often observed, the 

 general question of the existence of 

 Efficient Causes does not fall within 

 the limits of our subject : but a theory 

 which represents them as capable of 

 being subjects of human knowledge, 

 and which passes off as efficient causes 

 what are only physical or phenomenal 

 causes, belongs as much to Logic as 

 to Metaphysics, and is a fit subject 

 for discussion here. 



To my apprehension, a volition is 

 not an efficient, but simply a physical 

 cause. Our will causes our bodily 

 actions in the same sense, and in no 

 other, in which cold causes ice, or a 

 spark causes an explosion of gun- 

 powder. The volition, a state of our 

 mind, is the antecedent ; the motion 

 of our limbs in conformity to the voli- 

 tion is the consequent. This sequence 

 I conceive to be not a subject of direct 

 consciousness, in the sense intended 

 by the theory. The antecedent, in- 

 deed, and the consequent, are subjects 

 of consciousness. But the connection 



