238 



INDUCTION. 



By what rule is any one to decide 

 between one theory of this descrip- 

 tion and another ? The theorists do 

 not direct us to any external evidence; 

 they appeal each to his own subjective 

 feelings. One says, The succession C, 



B, appears to me more natural, con- 

 ceivable, and credible per se, than the 

 succession A, B ; you are therefore 

 mistaken in thinking that B depends 

 upon A ; I am certain, though I can 

 give no other evidence of it, that C 

 comes in between A and B, and is 

 the real and only cause of B. The 

 other answers, The successions C, B, 

 and A, B, appear to me equally natu- 

 ral and conceivable, or the latter more 

 so than the former : A is quite cap- 

 able of producing B without any other 

 intervention. A third agrees with the 

 first in being unable to conceive that 

 A can produce B, but finds the se- 

 quence D, B, still more natural than 



C, B, or of nearer kin to the subject- 

 matter, and prefers his D theory to 

 the C theory. It is plain that there 

 is no universal law operating here, 

 except the law that each person's con- 

 ceptions are governed and limited by 

 his individual experiences and habits 

 of thought. We are warranted in 

 saying of all three, what each of 

 them already believes of the other 

 two, namely, that they exalt into an 

 original law of the human intellect 

 and of outward nature, one particular 

 sequence of phenomena, which appears 

 to them more natural and more con- 

 ceivable than other sequences, only 

 because it is more familiar. And 

 from this judgment I am unable to 

 except the theory that Volition is an 

 Efficient Cause. 



I am unwilling to leave the subject 

 without adverting to the additional 

 fallacy contained in the corollary from 

 this theory ; in the inference that be- 

 cause Volition is an efficient cause, 

 therefore it is the only cause, and the 

 direct agent in producing even what 

 is apparently produced by something 

 else. Volitions are not known to pro- 

 duce anything directly except nervous 

 action, for the will influences eyeu 



the muscles only through the nerves. 

 Though it were granted, then, that 

 every phenomenon has an efficient, 

 and not merely a phenomenal cause, 

 and that volition, in the case of the 

 peculiar phenomena which are known 

 to be produced by it, is that efficient 

 cause, are we therefore to say, with 

 these writers, that since we know of 

 no other efficient cause, and ought 

 not to assume one without evidence, 

 there is no other, and volition is the 

 direct cause of all phenomena ? A 

 more outrageous stretch of infer- 

 ence could hardly be made. Because 

 among the infinite variety of the 

 phenomena of nature there is one, 

 namely, a particular mode of action 

 of certain nerves, which has for its 

 cause, and, as we are now supposing, 

 for its efficient cause, a state of our 

 mind ; and because this is the only 

 efficient cause of which we are con- 

 scious, being the only one of which 

 in the nature of the case we can be 

 conscious, since it is tlie only one 

 which exists within ourselves ; does 

 this justify us in concluding that all 

 other phenomena must have the same 

 kind of efficient cause with that one 

 eminently special, narrow, and pecu- 

 liarly human or animal phenomenon? 

 The nearest parallel to this specimen 

 of generalisation is suggested by the 

 recently revived controversy on the 

 old subject of Plurality of Worlds, in 

 which the contending parties have 

 been so conspicuously successful in 

 overthrowing one another. Here also 

 we have experience only of a single 

 case, that of the world in which we 

 live, but that this is inhabited we 

 know absolutely, and without possi- 

 bility of doubt. Now if on this evi- 

 dence any one were to infer that 

 every heavenly body without excep- 

 tion, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed 

 star or nebula, is inhabited, and must 

 be so from the inherent constitution 

 of things, his inference would exactly 

 resemble that of the writers, who con- 

 clude that because volition is the effi- 

 cient cause of our own bodily motions, 

 it must be the efficient cause of every. 



