364 



INDUCTION. 



case, we may both extend the deriva- 

 tive uniformity over a larger space, 

 and vi^ith less abatement for the chance 

 of counteracting causes. The first, be- 

 cause, instead of the local boundai'ies 

 of our observation of the fact itself, 

 we may include the extreme boun- 

 daries of the ascertained influence of 

 its causes. Thus the succession of 

 day and night, we know, holds true 

 of all the bodies of the solar system 

 except the sun itself ; but we know 

 this only because we are acquainted 

 with the causes : if we were not, we 

 could not extend the proposition be- 

 yond the orbits of the earth and 

 moon, at both extremities of which 

 we have the evidence of observation 

 for its truth. With respect to the 

 probability of counteracting causes, 

 it has been seen that this calls for a 

 greater abatement of confidence, in 

 proportion to our ignorance of the 

 causes on which the phenomena de- 

 pend. On both accounts, therefore, 

 a derivative law which we know how 

 to resolve is susceptible of a greater 

 extension to cases adjacent in place 

 than a merely empirical law. 



CHAPTER XX. 



OF ANALOGY. 



§ I. Thk word Analogy, as the 

 name of a mode of reasoning, is gene- 

 rally taken for some kind of argu- 

 ment supposed to be of an inductive 

 nature, but not amounting to a com- 

 plete induction. There is no word, 

 however, which is used more loosely, 

 or in a greater variety of senses, than 

 Analogy. It sometimes stands for 

 arguments which may be examples of 

 the most rigorous Induction. Arch- 

 bishop Whately, for instance, fol- 

 lowing Ferguson and other writers, 

 defines Analogy conformably to 

 its primitive acceptation, that which 

 was given to it by mathematicians, 

 Resemblance of Relations. In this 

 sense, when a country which has 

 sent out colonies ia termed the mother 



country, the expression is analogi- 

 cal, signifying that the colonies of a 

 country stand in the same relation to 

 her in which children stand to their 

 parents. And if any inference be 

 drawn from this resemblance of rela- 

 tions, as, for instance, that obedience 

 or affection is due from colonies to 

 the mother country, this is called 

 reasoning by analogy. Or if it be 

 argued that a nation is most bene- 

 ficially governed by an assembly 

 elected by the people, from the ad- 

 mitted fact that other associations 

 for a common purpose, such as joint- 

 stock companies, are best managed 

 by a committee chosen by the parties 

 interested ; this, too, is an argument 

 from analogy in the preceding sense, 

 because its foundation is, not that 

 a nation is like a joint-stock company, 

 or Parliament like a board of direc- 

 tors, but that Parliament stands in 

 the same relation to the nation in 

 which a board of directors stands to 

 a joint-stock company. Now, in an 

 argument of this nature, there is no 

 inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. 

 Like other arguments from resem- 

 blance, it may amount to nothing, or 

 it may be a perfect and conclusive 

 induction. The circumstance in which 

 the two cases resemble may be cap- 

 able of being shown to be the material 

 circumstance ; to be that on which 

 all the consequences necessary to be 

 taken into account in the particular 

 discussion depend. In the example 

 last given, the resemblance is one of 

 relation ; the fundamentum relationis 

 being the management by a few 

 persons of affairs in which a much 

 greater number are interested along 

 with them. Now, some may contend 

 that this circumstance, which is com- 

 mon to the two cases, and the various 

 consequences which follow from it, 

 have the chief share in determining 

 all the effects which make up what 

 we term good or bad administration. 

 If they can establish this, their argu- 

 ment has the force of a rigorous in- 

 duction ; if they cannot, they are 

 said to have failed in proving the 



