EVIDENCE OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION. 



369 



more clearly in the progress of the 

 investigation, the basis of all these 

 logical operations is the law of causa- 

 tion. The validity of all the Inductive 

 Methods depends on the assumption 

 that every event, or the beginning of 

 every phenomenon, must have some 

 cause, some antecedent, on the ex- 

 istence of which it is invariably and 

 unconditionally consequent. In the 

 Method of Agreement this is obvious ; 

 that method avowedly proceeding on 

 the supposition that we have found 

 the true cause as soon as we have 

 negatived every other. The assertion 

 is equally true of the Method of 

 Difiference. That method authorises 

 us to infer a general law from two 

 instances ; one, in which A exists 

 together with a multitude of other 

 circumstances, and B follows ; an- 

 other, in which A being removed, 

 and all other circumstances remaining 

 the same, B is prevented. What, 

 however, does this prove ? It proves 

 that B, in the particular instance, 

 cannot have had any other cause than 

 A ; but to conclude from this that A 

 was the cause, or that A will on other 

 occasions be followed by B, is only 

 allowable on the assumption that B 

 must have some cause ; that among 

 its antecedents in any single instance 

 in which it occurs, there must be 

 one which has the capacity of pro- 

 ducing it at other times. This being 

 admitted, it is seen that in the case 

 in question that antecedent can be 

 no other than A ; but, that if it be 

 no other than A it must be A, is not 

 proved, by these instances at least, 

 but taken for granted. There is no 

 need to spend time in proving that 

 the same thing is true of the other 

 Inductive Methods. The universality 

 of the law of causation is assumed in 

 them all. 



But is this assumption warranted ? 

 Doubtless (it may be said) most pheno- 

 mena are connected as effects with som e 

 antecedent or cause, that is, are never 

 produced imless some assignable fact 

 has preceded them ; but the very cir- 

 cumstance that complicated processes 



of induction are sometimes necessary, 

 shows that cases exist in which this 

 regular order of succession is not ap- 

 parent to our unaided apprehension. 

 If, then, the processes which bring 

 these cases within the same category 

 with the rest require that we should 

 assume the universality of the very 

 law which they do not at first sight 

 appear to exemplify, is not this a 

 petitio principii? Can we prove a 

 proposition by an argument which 

 takes it for granted? And if not 

 so proved, on what evidence does it 

 rest? 



For this difficulty, which I have 

 purposely stated in the strongest terms 

 it will admit of, the school of meta- 

 physicians who have long predomi- 

 nated in this country find a ready 

 salvo. They affirm that the uni- 

 versality of causation is a truth which 

 we cannot help believing ; that the 

 belief in it is an instinct, one of the 

 laws of our believing faculty. As the 

 proof of this, they say, and they have 

 nothing else to say, that everybody 

 does believe it ; and they number it 

 among the propositions, rather nume- 

 rous in their catalogue, which may be 

 logically argued against, and perhaps 

 cannot be logically proved, but which 

 are of higher authority than logic, 

 and so essentially inherent in the 

 human mind, that even he who denies 

 them in speculation shows by his 

 habitual practice that his arguments 

 make no impression upon himself. 



Into the merits of this question, 

 considered as one of psychology, it 

 would be foreign to my purpose to 

 enter here ; but I must protest against 

 adducing, as evidence of the truth of 

 a fact in external nature, the disposi- 

 tion, however strong or however gene- 

 ral, of the human mind to believe it. 

 Belief is not proof, and does not dis- 

 pense with the necessity of proof. I 

 am aware that to ask for evidence of 

 a proposition which we are supposed 

 to believe instinctively is to expose 

 oneself to the charge of rejecting the 

 authority of the human faculties ; 

 which of course no one can con- 



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