EVIDE^X^E OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION. 



571 



into which sidereal astronomy now 

 divides the universe, events may suc- 

 ceed one another at random without 

 any fixed law ; nor can anything in 

 our experience, or in our mental 

 nature, constitute a sufficient, or in- 

 deed any, reason for believing that 

 this is nowhere the case. 



Were we to suppose (what it is per- 

 fectly possible to imagine) that the 

 present order of the universe were 

 brought to an end, and that a chaos 

 succeeded in which there was no fixed 

 succession of events, and the past gave 

 no assurance of the future ; if a human 

 being were miraculously kept alive to 

 witness this change, he surely would 

 soon cease to believe in any uniformity, 

 the uniformity itself no longer exist- 

 ing. If this be admitted, the belief 

 in uniformity either is not an instinct, 

 or it is an instinct conquerable, like 

 all other instincts, by acquired know- 

 ledge. 



But there is no need to speculate 

 on what might be, when we have 

 positive and certain knowledge of 

 what has been. It is not true as a 

 matter of fact that mankind have 

 always believed that all the succes- 

 sions of events were uniform and 

 according to fixed laws. The Greek 

 philosophers, not even excepting 

 Aristotle, recognised Chance and 

 Spontaneity {tOxv and t6 avroixaTov) 

 as among the agents in nature ; in 

 other words, they believed that to 

 that extent there was no guarantee 

 that the past had been similar to 

 itself, or that the future would re- 

 semble the past. Even now a full 

 half of the philosophical world, in- 

 cluding the very same metaphysicians 

 who contend most for the instinctive 

 character of the belief in uniformity, 

 consider one important class of phe- 

 nomena, volitions, to be an exception 

 to the uniformity, and not governed 

 by a fixed law.* 



* I am happy to be able to qtiote the fol- 

 lowing excellent passnge from Mr. Badun 

 Powell's Essoy on the Inductive Pkiloxopht/, 

 in confirmation, both in regard to history 

 and to doctrine, of the statement made in 

 the text. Speaking of the "conviction of 



§ 2. As was observed in a former 

 place,* the belief we entertain in the 

 universality, throughout nature, of 

 the law of cause and effect, is itself 

 an instance of induction, and by no 

 means one of the earliest which any 

 of us, or which mankind in general, 



\ 

 the universal and permanent uniformity 

 of nature," Mr, Powell says (pp. 98-100) — 



" We may remark that tliis idea, in its 

 proper extent, ia by no means one of 

 popular acceptance or natural growth. 

 Just so far as the daily experience of 

 every one goes, so far indeed he coUies to 

 enibnce a certain persuasion of this kind, 

 but merely to this limited extent, that 

 what is going on around him at present, 

 in his own narrow sphere of observation, 

 will go on in like manner in future. The 

 peasant believes that the sun which rose, 

 to-day will rise again to-morrow ; that the 

 seed put into the ground will be followed 

 in due time by the luirvest this year as it 

 was last year, and the like, but ha.s no no- 

 tion of such inferences in subjects beyond 

 his immed late observation. A nd it should 

 be observed that each class of persons, in 

 admitting this belief within the limited 

 range of his own experience, though ha 

 doubt or deny it in everything beyond, in, 

 in fact, licariiig unconscious testimony to 

 its universal truth. Nor, again, is it only 

 among the most ignoraiit that this limitar 

 tiou is put upon the truth. There is a 

 very general propensity to believe that 

 everything beyond common experience, 

 or especially ascertained laws of nature, la, 

 left to the dominion of chance or fate or 

 arbitrary intervention, and even to object 

 to any attempted explanation by physical 

 causes, if conjecturally thrown out for an 

 appa' ently unaccountable phenomenon. 



"The precise doctrine of the generalisa' 

 tion of this idea of the uniformity of nature, 

 so far from being obvious, natur.il, or in- 

 tuitive, is utterly beyond the attainment 

 of the many. In all the extent of its uni- 

 versality it is characteristic of the philo- 

 .^opher. It is clearly the result of philo- 

 sopliic cultivation and training, and by no 

 means tlie spontaneous offspring of any 

 primary principle naturally inherent in 

 the mind, as some seem to believe. It is 

 no mere vague persuasion taken up with- 

 out examination, as a common preposses- 

 sion to which we are always accustomed ; 

 on the contrary, all common prejudices 

 and associations are against it. It is pre- 

 eminently an acquired idea. It is not at- 

 tained without deep study and reflection. 

 The best-mfoiToed philosopher is the man 

 who most fiimly believes it, even in op- 

 position to received notions; its acceptance 

 depends on the extent and profoundness 

 of his inductive studies." 



* Supra, book iii. ch. iii. § j. 



