EVIDENCE OF tlNlVERSAL CAUSATION. 



375 



observed in the fourth chapter of the 

 present book) depend the rules for 

 the improvement of the process. The 

 improvement consists in correcting 

 one of these inartificial generalisations 

 by means of another. As has been 

 already pointed out this is all that 

 art can do. To test a generalisation, 

 by showing that it either follows from, 

 or conflicts with, some stronger induc- 

 tion, some generalisation resting on a 

 broader foundation of experience is 

 the beginning and end of the logic of 

 Induction. 



§ 3. Now the precariousness of the 

 method of simple enumeration is in 

 an inverse ratio to the largeness of 

 the generalisation. The process is 

 delusive and insufficient, exactly in 

 proportion as the subject-matter of 

 the observation is special and limited 

 in extent. As the sphere widens, this 

 unscientific method becomes less and 

 less liable to mislead ; and the most 

 universal class of truths, the law of 

 causation for instance, and the princi- 

 ples of number and of geometry, are 

 duly and satisfactorily proved by that 

 method alone, nor are they susceptible 

 of any other proof. 



With respect to the whole class of 

 generalisations of which we have 

 recently treated, the uniformities 

 which depend on causation, the truth 

 of the remark just made follows by 

 obvious inference from the principles 

 laid down in the preceding chapters. 

 When a fact has been observed a 

 certain number of times to be true, 

 and is not in any instance known to 

 be false ; if we at once affirm that 

 fact as an universal truth or law of 

 nature, without either testing it by 

 any of the four methods of induction, 

 or deducing it from other known laws, 

 we shall in general err grossly ; but 

 we are perfectly justified in affirming 

 it as an empirical law, true within 

 certain limits of time, place, and 

 circumstance, provided the number of 

 coincidences be greater than can with 

 any probability be ascribed to chance. 

 The reason for not extending it be- 



yond those limits is, that the fact of 

 its holding true within them may be 

 a consequence of collocations, which 

 cannot be concluded to exist in one 

 place because they exist in another ; 

 or may be dependent on the accidental 

 absence of counteracting agencies, 

 which any variation of time, or the 

 smallest change of circumstances, may 

 possibly bring into play. If we sup- 

 pose, then, the subject-matter of any 

 generalisation to be so widely diffused 

 that there is no time, no place, and no 

 combination of circumstances, but 

 must afford an example either of its 

 truth or of its falsity, and if it be never 

 found otherwise than true, its truth 

 cannot be contingent on any colloca- 

 tions, unless such as exist at all times 

 and places ; nor can it be frustrated 

 by any counteracting agencies, unless 

 by such as never actually occur. It 

 is, therefore, an empirical law co-ex- 

 tensive with all human experience, at 

 which point the distinction between 

 empirical laws and laws of nature 

 vanishes, and the proposition takes 

 its place among the most firmly estab- 

 lished as well as largest truths ac- 

 cessible to science. 



Now, the most extensive in its 

 subject-matter of all generalisations 

 which experience warrants, respecting 

 the sequences and co-existences of 

 phenomena, is the law of causation. 

 It stands at the head of all observed 

 uniformities in point of universality, 

 and therefore (if the preceding obser- 

 vations are correct) in point of cer- 

 tainty. And if we consider, not what 

 mankind would have been justified 

 in believing in the infancy of their 

 knowledge, but what may rationally 

 be believed in its present more ad- 

 vanced state, we shall find ourselves 

 warranted in considering this funda- 

 mental law, though itself obtained 

 by induction from particular laws of 

 causation, as not less certain, but, on 

 the contrary, more so, than any of 

 those from which it was drawn. It 

 adds to them as much proof as it 

 receives from them. For there is 

 probably no one even of the best 



