378 



INDFCTION. 



invariable sequences among the suc- 

 cessive stages of the same effect, as 

 well as between the effects resulting 

 from causes which invariably succeed 

 one another. 



In the same manner with these 

 derivative uniformities of succession, 

 a great variety of uniformities of co- 

 existence also take their rise. Co- 

 ordinate effects of the same cause 

 naturally co-exist with one another. 

 High water at any point on the earth's 

 surface, and high water at the point 

 diametrically opposite to it, are effects 

 uniformly simultaneous, resulting 

 from the direction in which the com- 

 bined attractions of the sun and moon 

 act upon the waters of the ocean. An 

 eclipse of the sun to us, and an eclipse 

 of the earth to a spectator situated in 

 the moon, are in like manner pheno- 

 mena invariable co-existent ; and their 



most persons, both scientific and unscien- 

 tific, believe that there are well-authenti- 

 cated cases of breach in the uniformity of 

 nature, namely, miracles. Neither does this 

 consideration touch what I have said in the 

 text. I admit no other uniformity in tiie 

 events of nature than the law of Causation ; 

 and (as I have explained in the chapter of 

 this volume which treats of the Groimds 

 of Disbelief) a miracle is no exception to 

 that law. In every case of alleged miracle, 

 a new antecedent is affirmed to exist ; a 

 counteracting cause, namely, the volition of 

 a supernatural being. To all, therefore, to 

 whom beings with superhuman power over 

 nature are a vera causa, a miracle is a case 

 of the Law of Universal Causation, not a 

 deviation from it 



Dr. Ward's last, and, as he says, strongest 

 argument, is the familiar one of Reid, 

 Stewart, and their followers — that what- 

 ever knowledge experience gives us of the 

 past and present, it uives us none of the 

 future. I confess that I see no force what- 

 ever in this argument. Wherein does a 

 future fact differ from a present or a past 

 fact, except in their merely momentary 

 rela:tioii to the human beings at present in 

 existence ? The answer made by Priestley, 

 in his examination of Reid, seems to me 

 sufficient, viz., that though we have had 

 no experience of what is future, we have 

 had abundant experience of wliat ua* 

 future. The "leap in th« dark" (ag Pro- 

 les.sor Bain call* it) from the past to the 

 future is exactly as mucli in the dark, and 

 no more, as the leap from a past which we 

 liave personally observed to a past which 

 we have not. I agi'ee with Mr. Bain in the 

 ©pinion that the resemblance of what we 



co-existence can equally be deduced 

 from the laws of their production. 



It is an obvious question, therefore, 

 whether all the uniformities of co- 

 existence among phenomena may not 

 be accounted for in this manner. And 

 it cannot be doubted that between 

 phenomena which are themselves 

 effects, the co-existences must neces- 

 sarily depend on the causes of those 

 phenomena. If they are effects im- 

 mediately or remotely of the same 

 cause, they cannot co-exist except by 

 virtue of some laws or properties of 

 that cause : if they are effects of dif- 

 ferent causes, they cannot co-exist un- 

 less it be because their causes co-exist ; 

 and the uniformity of co-existence, 

 if such there be, between the effects, 

 proves that those particular causes, 

 within the limits of our observation, 

 have uniformly been co-existent. 



have not experienced to what we have, is, 

 by a law of our nature, presumed thiough 

 the mere energy of the idea, before ex- 

 perience has proved it. This psychological 

 truth, however, is not, as Dr. Ward when 

 criticising Mr. Bain appears to think, in- 

 consistent with tlie logical truth that ex- 

 perience does prove it. The proof comes 

 after the piesumption, and consists in its 

 invariable verificatioii by experience when 

 tile experience arrives. The fact which 

 while it was future could not be observed, 

 having as yet no existence, is always, when 

 it becomes present and can be observed, 

 found conformable to the past. 



Dr. M'Cosh maintains {Examination of 

 Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy, p. 257) that the 

 uniformity of the course of nature is a 

 different thing from the law of causation ; 

 and while he allows that the foi-mer is only 

 proved by a long continuance of experience, 

 and that it is not inconceivable nor neces- 

 sarily incredible that there may be worlds 

 in which it does not prevail, he considers 

 the law of causation to be known intui- 

 tively. There is, however, no other uni- 

 fomiiry in the events of nature than that 

 which arises from the law of causation : 

 so long therefore as there remained any 

 doubt that the coiirse of nature was u 1 dform 

 throughout, at least when not modified by 

 the intervention of a new (supernatural) 

 cause, a doubt was necessarily implied, not 

 indeed of the reality of cau-sation, but of it« 

 universality. If the uniformity of the 

 course of nature has any exceptions— if 

 any events succeed one another without 

 fixed Liws — to that extent the law of causa- 

 tion faiLs : tiiere are events which do not 

 depend on causes. 



