410 



INDUCTION. 



cal antecedents may have been hidden 

 from us) no evidence can prove a 

 miracle to any one who did not pre- 

 viously believe the existence of a Being 

 or beings with supernatural power, 

 or who believes himself to have full 

 proof that the character of the Being 

 whom he recognises is inconsistent 

 with his having seen fit to interfere 

 on the occasion in question. 



If we do not already believe in 

 supernatural agencies, no miracle can 

 prove to us their existence. The mir- 

 acle itself, considered merely as an 

 extraordinary fact, may be satisfac- 

 torily certified by our senses or by 

 testimony ; but nothing can ever prove 

 that it is a piiracle : there is still 

 another possible hypothesis, that of its 

 being the result of some unknown 

 natural cause ; and this possibility 

 cannot be so completely shut out as 

 to leave no alternative but that of 

 admitting the existence and interven- 

 tion of a Being superior to nature. 

 Those, however, who already believe 

 in such a Being, have two hypotheses 

 to choose from, a supernatural and an 

 unknown natural agency ; and they 

 have to judge which of the two is the 

 most probable in the particular case. 

 In forming this judgment, an impor- 

 tant element of the question will be 

 the conformity of the result to the 

 laws of the supposed agent, that is, 

 to the character of the Deity as they 

 conceive it. But, with the knowledge 

 which we now possess of the general 

 uniformity of the course of nature, 

 religion, following in the wake of 

 science, has been compelled to ac- 

 knowledge the government of the 

 universe as being on the whole carried 

 on by general laws, and not by special 

 interpositions. To whoever holds this 

 belief, there is a general presumption 

 against any supposition of divine 

 agency not operating through general 

 laws, or, in other words, there is an 

 antecedent improbability in every 

 miracle, which, in order to outweigh 

 it. requires an extraordinary strength 

 of antecedent probability derived from 

 the special circimistances of the case. 



§ 3. It appeari from what lias been 

 said, that the assertion that a cause 

 has been defeated of an effect which 

 is connected with it by a completely 

 ascertained law of causation, is to be 

 disbelieved or not, according to the 

 probability or improbability that there 

 existed in the particular instance an 

 adequate counteracting cause. To 

 form an estimate of this is not more 

 difficult than of other probabilities. 

 With regard to all hnoion causes cap- 

 able of counteracting the given causes, 

 we have generally some previous know- 

 ledge of the frequency or rarity of 

 their occurrence, from which we may 

 draw an inference as to the ante- 

 cedent improbability of their having 

 been present in any particular case. 

 And neither in respect to known nor 

 unknown causes are we required to 

 pronounce on the probability of their 

 existing in nature, but only of their 

 having existed at the time and place 

 at which the transaction is alleged 

 to have happened. We are seldom, 

 therefore, without the means (when 

 the circumstances of the case are at 

 all known to us) of judging how far 

 it is likely that such a cause should 

 have existed at that time and place 

 without manifesting its presence by 

 some other marks, and (in the case of 

 an unknown cause) without having 

 hitherto manifested its existence in 

 any other instance. Accordinij as 

 this circumstance, or the falsity of 

 the testimony, appears more impro- 

 bable, that is, conflicts with an approxi- 

 mate generalisation of a higher order, 

 we believe the testimony, or disbelieve 

 it, with a stronger or a weaker degree 

 of conviction according to the prepon- 

 derance, at least until we have sifted 

 the matter farther. 



So much, then, for the case in which 

 the alleged fact conflicts, or appears 

 to conflict, with a real law of causa- 

 tion. But a more common case, per- 

 haps, is that of its conflicting with 

 uniformities of mere co-existence, not 

 proved to be dependent on causation : 

 in other words, with the properties of 

 Kinds, It is with these uniformities 



