GROUNDS OF DISBELIEF. 



413 



committed by some of the writers 

 against Hume's Essay on Miracles, 

 and by Bishop Butler before them, 

 in their anxiety to destroy what ap- 

 peared to them a formidable weapon 

 of assault against the Christian reli- 

 gion, and the effect of which is en- 

 tirely to confound the doctrine of the 

 Grounds of Disbelief. The mistake 

 consists in overlooking the distinction 

 between (what may be called) impro- 

 bability before the fact and improba- 

 bility after it ; or (since, as Mr. Venn 

 remarks, the distinction of past and 

 future is not the material circum- 

 stance) between the improbability of a 

 mere guess being right and the impro- 

 bability of an alleged fact being true. 

 Many events are altogether im- 

 probable to us before they have hap- 

 pened, or before we are informed of 

 their happening, which are not in the 

 least incredible when we are informed 

 of them, because not contrary to any, 

 even approximate, induction. In the 

 cast of a perfectly fair die, the chances 

 are five to one against throwing ace, 

 that is, ace will be thrown on an 

 average only once in six throws. But 

 this is no reason against believing 

 that ace was thrown on a given oc- 

 casion, if any credible witness asserts 

 it, since, though ace is only thrown 

 once in six times, some number which 

 is only thrown once in six times must 

 have been thrown if the die was 

 thrown at all. The improbability, 

 then, or, in other words, the unusual- 

 ness, of any fact is no reason for dis- 

 believing it, if the nature of the case 

 renders it certain that either that or 

 something equally improbable, that 

 is, equally unusual, did happen. Nor 

 is this all ; for even if the other five 

 sides of the die were all twos or all 

 threes, yet as ace would still on the 

 average come up once in every six 

 throws, its coming up in a given 

 throw would be not in any way con- 

 tradictory to experience If we dis- 

 believed all facts which had the 

 chances against them beforehand, we 

 should believe hardly anything. We 

 are told that A. B. died yesterday : 



the moment before we were so told, 

 the chances against his having died 

 on that day may have been ten thou- 

 sand to one ; but since he was certain 

 to die at some time or other, and when 

 he died must necessarily die on some 

 particular day, while the preponder- 

 ance of chances is very great against 

 every day in particular, experience 

 affords no ground for discrediting 

 any testimony which may be pro- 

 duced to the event's having taken 

 place on a given day. 



Yet it has been considered, by Dr. 

 Campbell and others, as a complete 

 answer to Hume's doctrine (that 

 things are incredible which are con- 

 trmy to the uniform course of ex- 

 perience) that we do not disbelieve, 

 merely because the chances were 

 against them, things in strict con- 

 formity to the uniform course of ex- 

 perience ; that we do not disbelieve 

 an alleged fact merely because the 

 combination of causes on which it 

 depends occurs only once in a certain 

 number of times. It is evident that 

 whatever is shown by observation, or 

 can be proved from laws of nature, to 

 occur in a certain proportion (how- 

 ever small) of the whole number of 

 possible cases, is not contrary to ex- 

 perience, though we are right in dis- 

 believing it if some other supposition 

 respecting the matter in question in- 

 volves on the whole a less departure 

 from the ordinary course of events. 

 Yet, on such grounds as this have 

 able writers been led to the extraor- 

 dinary conclusion that nothing sup- 

 ported by credible testimony ought 

 ever to be disbelieved. 



§ 5. We have considered two species 

 of events, commonly said to be im- 

 probable ; one kind which are in no 

 way extraordinary, but which, having 

 an immense preponderance of chances 

 against them, are improbable until 

 they are affirmed, but no longer ; 

 another kind which, being contrary 

 to some recognised law of nature, are 

 incredible on any amount of testi- 

 mony except such as would be suffi- 



