43^ 



OPERATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION. 



of such an uniformity is required as 

 a justification for drawing the infer- 

 ence in even a single case. This uni- 

 formity, therefore, may be ascertained 

 once for all ; and if, being ascertained, 

 it can be remembered, it will serve as 

 a formula for making, in particular 

 cases, all such inferences as the pre- 

 vious experience will warrant. But 

 we can only secure its being remem- 

 bered, or give ourselves even a chance 

 of carrying in our memory any con- 

 siderable number of such uniformi- 

 ties, by registering them through the 

 medium of permanent signs, which 

 (being, from the nature of the case, 

 signs not of an individual fact, but of 

 an vmiformity, that is, of an indefinite 

 number of facts similar to one an- 

 other) are general signs, universals, 

 general names, and general proposi- 

 tions. 



§ 4. And here I cannot omit to 

 notice an oversight committed by 

 some eminent thinkers, who have 

 said that the cause of our using general 

 names is the infinite multitude of in- 

 dividual objects, which, making it 

 impossible to have a name for each, 

 compels us to make one name serve 

 for many. This is a very limited view 

 of the function of general names. 

 Even if there were a name for every 

 individual object, we should require 

 general names as much as we now do. 

 Without them we could not express 

 the result of a single comparison, nor 

 record any one of the uniformities 

 existing in nature ; and should be 

 hardly better off in respect to Induc- 

 tion than if we had no names at all. 

 With none but names of individuals, 

 (or, in other words, proper names,) 

 we might, by pronouncing the name, 

 suggest the idea of the object, but 

 we could not assert any proposition, 

 except the unmeaning ones formed by 

 predicating two proper names one 

 of another. It is only by means of 

 general names that we can convey 

 any information, predicate any attri- 

 bute, even of an individual, much 

 more of a class. Rigorously speaking, 



J 



ther 



we could get on without any otner 

 general names than the abstract names 

 of attributes ; all our propositions 

 might be of the form "such an indi- 

 vidual object possesses such an attri- 

 bute," or " such an attribute is always 

 (or never) conjoined with such another 

 attribute." In fact, however, man- 

 kind have always given general names 

 to objects as well as attributes, and 

 indeed before attributes; but the 

 general names given to objects imply 

 attributes, derive their whole meaning 

 from attributes, and are chiefly use- 

 ful as the language by means of which 

 we predicate the attributes which they 

 connote. 



It remains to be considered what 

 principles are to be adhered to in 

 giving general names, so that thessi 

 names, and the general propositions 

 in which they fill a place, may con- 

 duce most to the purposes of Induc- 

 tion. 



CHAPTER IV. 



OF THE REQUISITES OP A PHILCSO- 

 PHICAL LANGUAGE, AND THE PRIN- 

 CIPLES OF DEFINITION. 



§ I . In order that we may possess 

 a language perfectly suitable for the 

 investigation and expression of gene- 

 ral truths, there are two principal and 

 several minor requisites. The first 

 is, that every general name should 

 have a meaning, steadily fixed and 

 precisely determined. When, by the 

 fulfilment of this condition, such 

 names as we possess are fitted for the 

 due performance of their functions, 

 the next requisite, and the second in 

 order of importance, is that we should 

 possess a name wherever one isneeded ; 

 wherever there is anything to be de- 

 signated by it, which it is of import- 

 ance to express. 



The former of these requisites is 

 that to which our attention will be 

 exclusively directed in the present 

 chapter. 



§ 2. Every general name, then, must 



I 



