REQUISITES OE LANGUAGE. 



437 



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lijvvc a certain and knowable mean- 

 ing. Now the meaning (as has so 

 often been explained) of a general 

 connotative name resides in the con- 

 notation ; in the attribnte on account 

 of which, and to express which, the 

 name is given. Thus, the name ani- 

 mal being given to all things which 

 j)ossess the attributes of sensation 

 and voluntary motion, the word con- 

 notes those attributes exclusively, and 

 tiiey constitute the whole of its mean- 

 ing. If the name be abstract, its 

 denotation is the same with the con- 

 notation of the corresiK)nding con- 

 crete ; it designates directly the attri- 

 bute which the concrete term implies. 

 To give a precise meaning to general 

 names is, then, to fix with steadiness 

 the attribute or attributes connoted 

 by each concrete general name, and 

 denoted by the corresponding ab- 

 stract. Since abstract names, in the 

 t)rder of their creation, do not pre- 

 cede but follow concrete ones, a.s is 

 proved by the etymological fact that 

 they are almost always derived from 

 them, we may consider their meaning 

 ;is determined by and dependent on 

 the meaning of their concrete ; and 

 thus the problem of giving a distinct 

 meaning to general language is all 

 included in that of giving a precise 

 connotation to all concrete general 

 names. 



This is not difficult in the case of 

 new names — of the technical terms 

 created by scientific inquirers for the 

 piu-poses of science or art. But when 

 a name is in common use, the dii^- 

 culty is greater ; the problem in this 

 case not being that of choosing a con- 

 venient connotation for the name, 

 but of ascertaining and fixing the 

 connotation with which it is already 

 used. That this can ever be a matter 

 of doubt is a sort of paradox. But 

 the vulgar (including in that term 

 all who have not accurate habits of 

 thought) seldom know exactly what 

 assertion they intend to make, what 

 common property they mean to ex- 

 press, when they apply the same name 

 to a number of dilfereut thin-rs. All 



which the name expresses with them, 

 when they predicate it of an object, 

 is a confused feeling of resemblance 

 b(;tween that object and some of the H 

 other things which they have been 

 accustomed to denote by the name. 

 They have applied the name Stone to 

 various objects previously seen ; they 

 see a new object, which appears to 

 them somewhat like the former, and 

 they call it a stone, without asking 

 themselves in what respect it is like, 

 or what nuxle or degree of resemblance 

 the best authorities, or even they them- 

 selves, require as a warrant for using 

 the name. This rough general im- 

 pression of resemblance is, however, 

 made up of particular circumstances 

 of resemblance ; and into these it is 

 the business of the logician to analyse 

 it — to ascertain what points of re- 

 semblance among the different things 

 commonly called by the name have 

 pnxluced in the common mind this 

 vague feeling of likeness — have given 

 to the things the similarity of aspect 

 which has made them a class, and has 

 caused the same name to be bestowed 

 upon them. 



But though general names are im- 

 posed by the vulgar without any more 

 definite connotation than that of a 

 vague resemblance, general proposi- 

 tions come in time to be made, in 

 which predicates are applied to those 

 names, that is, general assertions are 

 made concerning the whole of the 

 things which are denoted by the 

 name. And since by each of these 

 propositions some attribute, more or 

 less precisely conceived, is of course 

 predicated, the ideas of these various 

 attributes thus become associated with 

 the name, and in a sort of uncertain 

 way it comes to connote them ; there 

 is a hesitation to apply the name in 

 any new case in which any of the 

 attributes familiarly predicated of the 

 class do not exist. And thus, to com- 

 mon minds, the propositions which 

 tliey are in the habit of liearing or 

 uttering concerning a class make up 

 in a loose way a sort of connotation 

 for the class-name. Let us take, for 



