HEQtriSlTES OP LANGUAGE: 



languages ; and in which, of course, 

 the uniformity of the result must be 

 ascribed to the essential principles 

 of the human frame. Even in such 

 cases, however, it will by no means 

 be always found, on examination, that 

 the various applications of the same 

 term have arisen from any common 

 quality or qualities in the objects to 

 which they relate. In the greater 

 luxmber of instances, they may be 

 traced to some natural and universal 

 associations of ideas, founded in the 

 common faculties, common organs, 

 and common condition of the human 

 race. . . . According to the different 

 degrees of intimacy and strength in 

 the associations on which the traiisi- 

 tions of languages are founded, very 

 tiiflferent effects may be expected to 

 arise. Where the association is slight 

 and casual, the several meanings will 

 remain distinct from each other, and 

 will often, in process of time, assume 

 the appearance of capricious varieties 

 in the use of the same arbitrary sign. 

 Whc7'e the association is so natural and 

 habitual as to become virtually indis- 

 soluble, the transitive meanings will 

 coalesce in one complex conception; 

 and every neio transition will become a 

 more comprehensive generalisation of 

 the term in question.'^ 



I solicit particular attention to the 

 law of mind expressed in the last sen- 

 tence, and which is the source of the 

 perplexity so often experienced in de- 

 tecting these transitions of meaning. 

 Ignorance of that law is the shoal on 

 which some of the most powerful in- 

 tellects which have adorned the hu- 

 man race have been stranded. The 

 inquiries of Plato into the definitions 

 of some of the most general terms of 

 moral speculation are characterised by 

 Bacon as a far nearer approach to a 

 true inductive method than is else- 

 where to be found among the ancients, 

 and are, indeed, almost perfect ex- 

 amples of the preparatory process of 

 comparison and abstraction ; but, from 

 being unaware of the law just men- 

 tioned, he often wasted the powers of 

 this great logical instrument on in- 



443 



quiries in which it could realise no 

 result, since the phenomena, whose 

 common properties he so elaborately 

 endeavoured to detect, had not really 

 any common properties. Bacon him- 

 self fell into the same error in his 

 speculations on the nature of heat, in 

 which he evidently confounded under 

 the name hot, classes of phenomena 

 which have no property in common. 

 Stewart certainly overstates the mat- 

 ter when he speaks of "a prejudice 

 which has descended to modern times 

 from the scholastic ages, that when a 

 word admits of a variety of signifi 

 cations, these different significations 

 must all be species of the same genus, 

 and must consequently include some 

 essential idea common to every indi- 

 vidual to which the generic term can 

 be applied ; " * for both Aristotle and 

 his followers were well aware that 

 there are such things as ambiguities 

 of language, and delighted in distin- 

 guishing thenj. But they never sus- 

 pected ambiguity in the cases where 

 (as Stewart remarks) the association 

 on which the transition of meaning 

 was founded is so natural and habi- 

 tual, that the two meanings blend to- 

 gether in the mind, and a real transi- 

 tion becomes an apparent generalisa- 

 tion. Accordingly they wasted in- 

 finite pains in endeavouring to find a 

 definition which would serve for seve- 

 ral distinct meanings at once ; as in 

 an instance noticed by Stewart him- 

 self, that of " causation : the am- 

 biguity of the word, which, in the 

 Greek language, corresponds to the 

 English word cause, having suggested 

 to them the vain attempt of tracing 

 the common idea which, in the case of 

 any effect, belongs to the efficient, to 

 the matter, to the /orwi, and to the 

 end. The idle generalities " (he adds) 

 " we meet with in other philosophers, 

 about the ideas of the good, the fit, 

 and the becoming, have taken their 

 rise from the same undue influence of 

 popular epithets on the speculations 

 of the learned." t 



* Essays, p. 214. f Ibid., p.' 215. 



