REQUISITES OF LANGUAGE. 



447 



the words and propositions lie ready 

 to suggest to any mind duly prepared 

 the remainder of the meaning. Such 

 individual minds are almost always 

 to be found ; and the lost meaning, 

 revived by them, again by degrees 

 works its way into the general mind. 

 The arrival of this salutary reaction 

 may, however, be materially retarded 

 by the shallow conceptions and in- 

 cautious proceedings of mere logicians. 

 It sometimes happens that towards 

 the close of the downward period, 

 when the words have lost part of their 

 .significance, and have not yet begun 

 to recover it, persons arise whose lead- 

 ing and favourite idea is the impor- 

 tance of clear conceptions and precise 

 thought, and the necessity, therefore, 

 i»f definite language. These persons, 

 in examining the old formulas, easily 

 perceive that words are used in them 

 without a meaning ; and if they are 

 n«)t the sort of persons who are cap- 

 able of rediscovering the lost signifi- 

 cation, they naturally enough dismiss 

 the formula, and define the name 

 without reference to it. In so doing 

 they fasten down the name to what 

 it connotes in common use at the 

 time when it conveys the .«;mallest 

 quantity of meaning ; and introduce 

 the practice of employing it consis- 

 tently and imiformly, according to 

 that connotation. The word in this 

 way acquires an extent of denotation 

 far beyond what it had before ; it be- 

 comes extended to many things to 

 which it was previously, in appear- 

 ance capriciously, refused. Of the 

 propositions in which it was formerly 

 used, those which were true in virtue 

 of the forgotten part of its meaning 

 are now, by the clearer light which 

 the definition diffuses, seen not to 

 be true according to the definition ; 

 which, however, is the recognised and 

 sufficiently correct expression of all 

 that is perceived to be in the mind of 

 any one by whom the term is used at 

 the present day. The ancient for- 

 mulas are consequently treated as 

 prejudices ; and people are no longer 

 taught as before, though not to under- 



stand them, yet to believe that there 

 is truth in them. They no longer re- 

 main in the general mind surrounded 

 by respect, and ready at any time to 

 suggest their original meaning. What- 

 ever truths they contain are not only, 

 in these circumstances, rediscovered 

 far more slowly, but, when redis- 

 covered, the prejudice with which 

 novelties are regarded is now, in some 

 degree at least, against them, instead 

 of being on their side. 



An example may make these re- 

 marks more intelligible. In all ages, 

 except where moral speculation has 

 been silenced by outward compulsion, 

 or where the feelings which prompt 

 to it still continue to be satisfied by 

 the traditional doctrines of an estab 

 lished faith, one of the subjects which 

 have most occupied the minds of 

 thinking persons is the inquiry, What 

 is virtue ? or, What is a virtuous char- 

 acter ? Among the different theories 

 on the subject which have, at different 

 times, grown up and obtained partial 

 currency, every one of which reflected 

 as in the clearest mirror the express 

 image of the age which gave it birth, 

 there was one, according to whicli 

 virtue consists in a correct calculation 

 of our own personal interests, either 

 in this world only, or also in another. 

 To make this theory plausible, it was 

 of course necessary that the only bene- 

 ficial actions which people in gene- 

 ral were accustomed to see, or were 

 therefore accustomed to praise, should 

 be such as were, or at least might 

 without contradicting obvious facts 

 b3 supposed to be, the result of a 

 prudential regard to self-interest ; so 

 that the words really connoted no 

 more, in common acceptation, than 

 was set down in the definition. 



Suppose, now, that the pj^rtisans 

 of this theory had contrived to intro- 

 duce a consistent and undeviating use 

 of the term according to this defini- 

 tion. Suppose that they had seriously 

 endeavoured, and had succeeded in 

 the endeavour, to banish the word 

 disinterestedness from the language ; 

 had obtained the disuse of all expres- 



