TERMINOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE. 



459 



enabling the mind to give its exclu- 

 sive attention to the relation between 

 the quantity S and the other quanti- 

 ties which enter into the equation, 

 without being distracted by thinking 

 unnecessarily of the parts of which S 

 is itself composed. 



But there is another reason, in ad- 

 dition to that of promoting perspi- 

 cuity, for giving a brief and compact 

 name to each of the more considerable 

 results of abstraction which are ob- 

 tained in the course of our intellec- 

 tual phenomena. By naming them, 

 we fix our attention upon them ; we 

 keep them more constantly before the 

 mind. The names are remembered, 

 and, being remembered, suggest their 

 definition ; while if, instead of specific 

 and characteristic names, the mean- 

 ing had been expressed by putting 

 together a number of other names, 

 that particular combination of words 

 already in common use for other pur- 

 poses would have had nothing to 

 make itself remembered by. If we 

 want to render a particular combina- 

 tion of ideas permanent in the mind, 

 there is nothing which clenches it 

 like a name specially devoted to ex- 

 press it. If mathematicians had been 

 obliged to speak of "that to which a 

 quantity, in increasing or diminish- 

 ing, is always approaching nearer, so 

 that the difference becomes less than 

 any assignable quantity, but to which 

 it never becomes exactly equal," in- 

 stead of expressing all this by the 

 simple phrase, " the limit of a quan- 

 tity," we should probably have long 

 remained without most of the impor- 

 tant truths which have been dis- 

 covered by means of the relation 

 between quantities of various kinds 

 and their limits. If, instead of speak- 

 ing of momentum, it had been neces- 

 sary to say, "the product of the 

 number of units of velocity in the 

 velocity by the number of units of 

 mass in the mass," many of the dyna- 

 mical truths now apprehended by 

 means of this complex idea would 

 probably have escaped notice, for 

 want of recalling the idea itself with 



sufficient readiness and familiarity. 

 And on subjects less remote from the 

 topics of popular discussion, whoever 

 wishes to draw attention to some 

 new or unfamiliar distinction among 

 things will find no way so sure as to 

 invent or select suitable names for 

 the express purpose of marking it. 



A volume devoted to explaining 

 what the writer means by civilisation 

 does not raise so vivid a conception 

 of it as the single expression, that 

 Civilisation is a different thing from 

 Cultivation ; the compactness of that 

 brief designation for the contrasted 

 quality being an equivalent for a long 

 discussion. So, if we would impress 

 forcibly upon the understanding and 

 memory the distinction between the 

 two different conceptions of a repre- 

 sentative government, we cannot more 

 effectually do so than by saying that 

 Delegation is not Representation. 

 Hardly any original thoughts on 

 mental or social subjects ever make 

 their way among mankind, ^or assume 

 their proper importance in the minds 

 even of their inventors, until aptly- 

 selected words or phrases have, as it 

 were, nailed them down and held 

 them fast. 



§ 4. Of the three essential parts of 

 a philosophical language, we have now 

 mentioned two : a terminology suited 

 for describing with precision the in- 

 dividual facts observed ; and a name 

 for every common property of any 

 importance or interest, which we de- 

 tect by comparing those facts : in- 

 cluding (as theconcretes corresponding 

 to those abstract terms) names for the 

 classes which we artificially construct 

 in virtue of those properties, or as 

 many of them, at least, as we have 

 frequent occasion to predicate any- 

 thing of. 



But there is a sort of classes, for 

 the recognition of which no such 

 elaborate process is necessary ; be- 

 cause each of them is marked out 

 from all others not by some one pro- 

 perty, the detection of which may 

 depend on a difficult act of abstraction, 



