482 



FALLACIES.' 



more complex phenomena of nature, 

 and especially those of which the 

 subject is man, whether as a moral 

 and intellectual, a social, or even as 

 a physical being ; the diversity of 

 opinions still prevalent among in- 

 structed persons, and the equal con- 

 fidence with which those of the most 

 contrary ways of thinking cling to 

 their respective tenets, are proof not 

 only that right modes of philosophis- 

 ing are not yet generally adopted on 

 those subjects, but that wrong ones 

 are ; that inquirers have not only in 

 general missed the truth, but have 

 often embraced error ; that even the 

 most cultivated portion of our species 

 have not yet learned to abstain from 

 drawing conclusions which the evi- 

 dence does not warrant. 



The only complete safeguard against 

 reasoning ill is the habit of reasoning 

 well ; familiarity with the principles 

 of correct reasoning, and practice in 

 applying those principles. It is, how- 

 ever, not unimportant to consider 

 what are the most common modes of 

 bad reasoning, by wliat appearances 

 the mind is most likely to be seduced 

 from the observance of true principles 

 of induction ; what, in short, are the 

 most common and most dangerous va- 

 rieties of Apparent Evidence, where- 

 by persons are misled into opinions 

 for which there does not exist evi- 

 dence really conclusive. 



A catalogue of the varieties of ap- 

 parent evidence which are not real 

 evidence is an enumeration of Fal- 

 lacies. Without such an enumera- 

 tion, therefore, the present work 

 would be wanting in an essential 

 point. And while writers, who in- 

 cluded in their theory of reasoning 

 nothing more than ratiocination have, 

 in consistency with this limita,,tion, 

 confined their remarks to the fallacies 

 which have their seat in that portion 

 of the process of investigation, we, 

 who profess to treat of the whole pro- 

 cess, must add to our directions for 

 performing it rightly warnings against 

 performing it wrongly in any of its 

 parts : whether the ratiocinative or the 



fS^' 



experimental portion of it be in 



or the fault lie in dispensing with rati 



cination and induction altogethez*. 



§ 2. In considering the sources of 

 unfounded inference, it is unnecessary 

 to reckon the errors which arise, not 

 from a wrong method, nor even from 

 ignorance of the right one, but from 

 a casual lapse, through hurry or in- 

 attention, in the application of the 

 true principles of induction. Such 

 en-ors, like the accidental mistakes in 

 casting up a sum, do not call for 

 philosophical analysis or classifica- 

 tion ; theoretical considerations can 

 throw no light upon the means of 

 avoiding them. In the present 

 treatise our attention is required, 

 not to mere inexpertness in perform- 

 ing the operation in the right Avay, 

 (the only remedies for which are in- 

 creased attention and more sedulous 

 practice,) but to the modes of per- 

 forming it in a way fundamentally 

 wrong ; the conditions under which 

 the human mind persuades itself that 

 it has sufficient grounds for a con- 

 clusion which it has not arrived at byJ 1 

 any of the legitimate methods of in-1 1 

 duction — which it has not, even care- 

 lessly or overhastily, endeavoured to 

 test by those legitimate methods. 



§ 3. There is another branch 

 what may be called the Philosophy of 

 Error which must be mentioned here, 

 though only to be excluded from onr 

 subject. The sources of erroneous 

 opini(ms are twofold — moral and in- 

 tellectual. Of these, the moral do not 

 fall within the compass of this work. 

 They may be classed under two 

 general heads : Indifference to the 

 attainment of truth, and Bias ; of 

 which last the most common case is 

 that in which we are biassed by our 

 wishes ; but the liability is almost as 

 great to the undiie adoption of a con- 

 clusion which is disagreeable to us, as 

 of one which is agreeable, if it be 

 of a nature to bring into action any 

 of the stronger passions. Persons of 

 timid character are the more predis- 



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