484 



FALLACIES. 



however really desirous of doing so ; 

 they could not, with all the inclina- 

 tion in the world, pass off upon 

 themselves bad arguments for good 

 ones. If the sophistry of the intellect 

 could be rendered impossible, that of 

 the feelings, having no instrument to 

 work with, would be powerless. A 

 comprehensive classification of all 

 those things which, not being evi- 

 dence, are liable to appear such to 

 the understanding, will, therefore, of 

 itself include all errors of judgment 

 arising from moral causes, to the ex- 

 clusion only of errors of practice com- 

 mitted against better knowledge. 



To examine, then, the various kinds 

 of apparent evidence which are not 

 evidence at all, and of appai-ently 

 conclusive evidence which do not 

 really amount to conclusiveness, is 

 the object of that part of our inquiry 

 into which we are about to enter. 



The subject is not beyond the com- 

 pass of classification and comprehen- 

 sive survey. The things, indeed, 

 which are not evidence of any given 

 conclusion, are manifestly endless, 

 and this negative property, having 

 no dependence on any positive ones, 

 cannot be made the groundwork of 

 a real classification. But the things 

 which, not being evidence, are suscep- 

 tible of being mistaken for it, are cap- 

 able of a classification having refer- 

 ence to the positive property which 

 they possess of appearing to be evi- 

 dence. We may arrange them, at our 

 choice, on either of two principles — 

 according to the caiise which makes 

 them appear to be evidence, not being 

 so ; or according to the particular 

 kind of evidence which they simulate. 

 The Classification of Fallacies which 

 will be attempted in the ensuing 

 chapter is founded on these considera- 

 tions jointly. 



CHAPTER IL 



CLASSIFICATION OP FALLACIES. 



§ I. In attempting to establish cer- 

 tain general distinctions which shall 



mark out from one another the various 

 kinds of Fallacious Evidence, we pro- 

 pose to ourselves an altogether dif- 

 ferent aim from that of several eminent 

 thinkers, who have given, under the 

 name of Political or other Fallacies, 

 a mere enumeration of a certain num- 

 ber of erroneous opinions ; false gene- 

 ral propositions which happen to be 

 often met with ; loci communes of bad 

 arguments on some particular subject. 

 Logic is not concerned with the false 

 opinions which people happen to en- 

 tertain, but with the manner in which 

 they come to entertain them. The 

 question is not, what facts have at 

 any time been erroneously supposed 

 to be proof of certain other facts, but 

 what property in the facts it was 

 which led any one to this mistaken 

 supposition. 



When a fact is supposed, though 

 incorrectly, to be evidentiary of, or a 

 mark of, some other fact, there must 

 be a cause of the error ; the supposed 

 evidentiary fact must be connected in 

 some particular manner with the fact 

 of which it is deemed evidentiary, — 

 must stand in some particular relation 

 to it, without which relation it would 

 not be regarded in that light. The 

 relation may either be one resulting 

 from the simple contemplation of the 

 two facts side by side with one another, 

 or it may depend on some process of 

 mind, by which a previous associa- 

 tion has been established between 

 them. Some peculiarity of relation, 

 however, there must be ; the fact 

 which can, even by the wildest aber- 

 ration, be supposed to prove another 

 fact, must stand in some special posi- 

 tion with regard to it ; and if we could ' 

 ascertain and define that special posi- 

 tion, we should perceive the origin of 

 the error. 



We cannot regard one fact as evi- 

 dentiary of another unless we believe 

 that the two are always, or in the 

 majority of cases, conjoined. If we 

 believe A to be evidentiary of B, if 

 when we see A we are inclined to infer 

 B from it, the reason is because we be- 

 lieve that wherever A is, B also either 



H 



