CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES. 



485 



alwaysorforthemost part exists, either 

 as an antecedent, a consequent, or a 

 concomitant. If when we see A we 

 are inclined not to expect B — if we 

 believe A to be evidentiary of the 

 absence of B— it is because we believe 

 that where A is, B either is never, 

 or at least seldom, found. Erroneous 

 conclusions, in short, no less than 

 correct conclusions, have an invariable 

 relation to a general formula, either 

 expressed or tacitly implied. When 

 we infer some fact from some other 

 fact which does not really prove it, 

 we either have admitted, or, if we 

 maintained consistency, ought to ad- 

 mit, some groundless general proposi- 

 tion respecting the conjunction of the 

 two phenomena. 



For every property, therefore, in 

 facts, or in our mode of considering 

 facts, which leads us to believe that 

 they are habitually conjoined when 

 they are not, or that they are not 

 when in reality they are, there is a 

 corresponding kind of Fallacy ; and 

 an enumeration of fallacies would 

 consist in a specification of those 

 properties in facts, and those pecu- 

 liarities in our mode of considering 

 them, which give rise to this errone- 

 ous opinion. 



§ 2. To begin, then ; the supposed 

 connection, or repugnance, between 

 the two facts, may either be a conclu- 

 sion from evidence, (that is, from some 

 jither proposition or propositions,) or 

 may be admitted without any such 

 ground ; admitted, as the phrase is, 

 on its own evidence ; embraced as 

 self-evident, as an axiomatic truth. 

 This gives rise to the first great dis- 

 tinction, that between Fallacies of 

 Inference and Fallacies of Simple 

 Inspection. In the latter division 

 must be included not only all cases in 

 which a proposition is believed and 

 held for true, literally without any 

 extrinsic evidence, either of specific 

 experience or general reasoning, but 

 those more frequent cases in which 

 simple inspection creates a presump- 

 tion in favour of a proposition ; not 



sufficient for belief, but sufficient to 

 cause the strict principles of a regular 

 induction to be dispensed with, and 

 creating a predisposition to believe it 

 on evidence which would be seen to 

 be insufficient if no such presumption 

 existed. This class, comprehending 

 the whole of what may be termed 

 Natural Prejudices, and which I shall 

 call indiscriminately Fallacies of Sim- 

 ple Inspection or Fallacies a priori, 

 shall be placed at the head of our list. 

 Fallacies of Inference, or erroneous 

 conclusions from supposed evidence, 

 must be subdivided according to the 

 nature of the apparent evidence from 

 which the conclusions are drawn ; or 

 (what is the same thing) according to 

 the particular kind of sound argument 

 which the fallacy in question simu- 

 lates. But there is a distinction to 

 be first drawn, which does not answer 

 to any of the divisions of sound argu- 

 ments, but arises out of the nature 

 of bad ones. We may know exactly 

 what our evidence is, and yet draw a 

 false conclusion from it : we may con- 

 ceive precisely what our premises are, 

 what alleged matters of fact, or gene- 

 ral principles, are the foundation of 

 our inference ; and 3'et, because the 

 premises are false, or because we have 

 inferred from them what they will 

 not support, our conclusion may be 

 erroneous. But a case, perhaps even 

 more frequent, is that in which the 

 error arises from not conceiving our 

 premises with due clearness, that is, 

 (as shown in the preceding Book,*) 

 with due fixity ; forming one concep- 

 tion of our evidence when we collect 

 or receive it, and another when we 

 make use of it ; or unadvisedly, and 

 in general unconsciously, substituting, 

 as we proceed, different premises in the 

 place of those with which we set out, 

 or a different conclusion for that which 

 we undertook to prove. This gives 

 existence to a class of fallacies which 

 may be justly termed (in a phrase 

 borrowed from Bentham) Fallacies 

 of Confusion ; comprehending, among 



* Supra, p. 431. 



