FALLACIES. 



filled up which should be capable of 

 being supplied in a valid argument, 

 it would either stand thus, (forming a 

 fallacy of one class, ) or thus, (a fal- 

 lacy of another ;) or at furthest we 

 may say, that the conclusion is most 

 Likely to have originated in a fallacy 

 of such and such a class. Thus in 

 the illustration just quoted, the error 

 committed may be traced with most 

 probability to a Fallacy of Generalisa- 

 tion ; that of mistaking an uncertain 

 mark, or piece of evidence, for a cer- 

 tain one ; concluding from an effect 

 to some one of its possible causes, 

 when there are others which would 

 bave been equally capable of produc- 

 ing it. 



Yet, though the five classes run 

 into each other, and a particular error 

 often seems to be arbitrarily assigned 

 to one of them rather than to any 

 of the rest, there is considerable use 

 in so distinguishing them. We shall 

 find it convenient to set apart, as 

 Fallacies of Confusion, those of which 

 confusion is the most obvious charac- 

 teristic ; in which no other cause can 

 be assigned for the mistake com- 

 mitted than neglect or inability to 

 state the question properly, and to 

 apprehend the evidence with defi- 

 niteness and precision. In the re- 

 maining four classes I shall place not 

 only the cases in which the evidence 

 is clearly seen to be what it is, and 

 yet a wrong conclusion drawn from it, 

 but also those in which, although 

 there be confusion, the confusion is 

 not the sole cause of the error, but 

 there is some shadow of a ground for 

 it in the nature of the evidence itself. 

 And in distributing these cases of 

 partial confusion among the four 

 classes, I shall, when there can be any 

 hesitation as to the precise seat of the 

 fallacy, suppose it to be in that part of 

 the process in which, from the nature 

 of the case and the tendencies of the 

 human mind, an error would in the 

 particular circumstances be the most 

 probable. 



After these observations we shall 

 proceed, Avithout further preamble, 



to consider the five classes in their 

 order. 



CHAPTER IIL 



FALIACIKS OF SIMPLE INSPECTION, OK 

 A PRIORI FALLACIES. 



§ I. The tribe of errors of which 

 we are to treat in the first instance 

 are those in which no actual infer- 

 ence takes place at all : the proposi- 

 tion (it cannot in such cases be called 

 a conclusion) being embraced, not as 

 proved, but as requiring no proof ; as 

 a self-evident proof ; or else as having 

 such intrinsic verisimilitude, that ex- 

 ternal evidence not in itself amount- 

 ing to proof is sufficient in aid of the 

 antecedent presumption. 



An attempt to treat this subject 

 comprehensively would be a trans- 

 gression of the bounds prescribed to 

 this work, since it would necessitate 

 the inquiry which, more than any 

 other, is the grand question of what 

 is called metaphysics, viz. What are 

 the propositions which may reason- 

 ably be received without proof ? That 

 there must be some such propositions 

 all are agreed, since there cannot be 

 an infinite series of proof, a chain 

 suspended from nothing. But to de- 

 termine what these propositions are 

 is the opus magnum of the more re- 

 condite mental philosophy. Two prin- 

 cipal divisions of opinion on the sub- 

 ject have divided the schools of philo- 

 sophy from its first dawn. The one 

 recognises no ultimate premises but 

 the facts of our subjective conscious- 

 ness ; our sensations, emotions, intel- 

 lectual states of mind, and volitions. 

 These, and whatever by strict rules 

 of mduction can be derived from these, 

 it is possible, according to this theory, 

 for us to know ; of all else we must 

 remain in ignorance. The opposite 

 school hold that there are other exist- 

 ences, suggested indeed to our minds 

 by these subjective phenomena, but 

 not inferrible from them by any pro- 

 cess either of deduction or of induc- 

 tion ; which, however, we must, by 



I 



