494 



FALLACIES. 



any absurdity at all in a thing so 

 simple and natural, to be what really 

 marks the absence of "a competent 

 faculty of thinking." No one now 

 feels any difficulty in conceiving gra- 

 vity to be, as much as any other pro- 

 perty is, " inherent and essential to 

 matter," nor finds the comprehension 

 of it facilitated in the smallest degree 

 uy the supposition of an ether, (though 

 some recent inquirers do give this as 

 an explanation of it,) nor thinks it 

 at all incredible that the celestial 

 bodies can and do act where they, in 

 actual bodily presence, are not. To 

 us it is not more wonderful that bodies 

 should act upon one another " with- 

 out mutual contact," than that they 

 should do so when in contact ; we are 

 familiar with both these facts, and we 

 find them equally inexplicable, but 

 equally easy to believe. To Newton, 

 the one, because his imagination was 

 familiar with it, appeared natural and 

 a matter of course, while the other, for 

 the contrary reason, seemed too absurd 

 to be credited. 



It is strange that any one, after 

 such a warning, should rely implicitly 

 on the evidence a priori of such pro- 

 positions as these : that matter cannot 

 think ; that space, or extension, is 

 infinite ; that nothing can be made 

 out of nothing [ex nihilo nihil Jit). 

 Whether these propositions are true 

 or not this is not the place to deter- 

 mine, nor even whether. the questions 

 are soluble by the human faculties. 

 But such doctrines are no more self- 

 evident truths than the ancient maxim 

 that a thing cannot act where it is 

 not, which probably is not now be- 

 lieved by any educated person in 

 Europe.* Matter cannot think ; why ? 

 because we cannot conceive thought 

 to be annexed to any arrangement of 

 material particles. Space is infinite, 

 because having never known any part 

 of it which had not other parts be- 



* This statement I must now correct, as 

 too tmqualified. The maxim in question 

 was maintained with full conviction by no 

 less an authority than Sir William Hamil- 

 ton, yee mjr Exarnination, chap. 3fxiv, 



yond it, we cannot conceive an absolute 

 termination. Ex nihilo nihil fit, be- 

 cause having never known any phy- 

 sical product without a pre-existing 

 physical material, we cannot, or think 

 we cannot, imagine a creation out of 

 nothing. But these things may ia 

 themselves be as conceivable as gravi- 

 tation without an intervening medium, 

 which Newton thought too great an 

 absurdity for any person of a com- 

 petent faculty of philosophical think- 

 ing to admit : and even supposing 

 them not conceivable, this, for aught 

 we know, may be merely one of the 

 limitations of our very limited minds, 

 and not in nature at all. 



No writer has more directly iden- 

 tified himself with the fallacy now 

 under consideration, or has embodied 

 it in more distinct terms, than Leib- 

 nitz. In his view, unless a thing 

 was not merely conceivable, but even 

 explainable, it could not exist in na- 

 ture. All 'natural phenomena, ac- 

 cording to him, nmst be susceptible 

 of being accounted for d priori. The 

 only facts of which no explanation 

 could be given but the will of God 

 were miracles properly so called. 

 " Je reconnais," says he,* "qu'il n'est 

 pas permis de nier ce qu'on n'entend 

 pas ; mais j'ajoute qu'on a droit de 

 nier (au moins dans I'ordre naturel) 

 ce que absolument n'est point in- 

 telligible ni explicable. Je soutiehs 

 aussi . . . qu'enfin la conception des 

 creatures n'est pas la mesure du 

 pouvoir de Dieu, mais que leur con- 

 ceptivite, ou force de concevoir, est 

 la mesure du pouvoir de la nature, 

 tout ce qui est conforme a I'ordre 

 naturel pouvant etre con^u ou en- 

 tendu par quelque creature." 



Not content with assuming that 

 nothing can be true which we are un- 

 able to conceive, scientific inquire I's 

 have frequently given a still further 

 extension to the doctrine, and held 

 that, even of things not altogether 

 inconceivable, that which we can con- 



'* Nouveaux Essais sar ' I'Entendement 

 Ilumain — Avant-propos. ((Euvres, Parii, 

 ed, 1842, vol. i. p. 19.) 



