5o6 



FALLACIES. 



some proposition true, would be a re- 

 flection on the goodness or wisdom 

 ot the Deity. Put into the simplest 

 possible terms, their argument is, "If 

 it had depended on me, I would not 

 have made the proposition true, there- 

 fore it is not true." Put into other 

 words it stands thus : " God is per- 

 fect, therefore (what I think) perfec- 

 tion must obtain in nature." But 

 since in reality every one feels that 

 nature is very far from perfect, the 

 doctrine is never applied consistently. 

 It furnishes an argument which (like 

 many others of a similar character) 

 people like to appeal to when it makes 

 for their own side. Nobody is con- 

 vinced by it, but each appears to 

 think that it puts religion on his side 

 of the question, and that it is a useful 

 weapon of ofifence for wounding an 

 adversary. 



Although several other varieties of 

 a priori fallacy might probably be 

 added to those here specified, these 

 are all against which it seems neces- 

 sary to give any special caut^'on. Our 

 object is to open, without attempting 

 or affecting to exhaust, the subject. 

 Having illustrated, therefore, this 

 first class of Fallacies at sufficient 

 length, I shall proceed to the second. 



CHAPTER IV. 



FALLACIES OP OBSERVATION. 



§ I. From the fallacies which are 

 properly Prejudices, or presumptions 

 antecedent to, and superseding proof, 

 we pass to those which lie in the 

 incorrect performance of the proving 

 process. And as Proof, in its widest 

 extent, embraces one or more, or all, 

 of three processes, Observation, Gene- 

 ralisation, and Deduction, we shall 

 consider in their order the errora 

 capable of being committed in these 

 three operations. And first, of the 

 first mentioned. 



A fallacy of misobservation may 

 be either negative or positive ; either 

 Non-observation or Mal-observation. 



It is non-observation when all the 

 error consists in overlooking or ne- 

 glecting facts or particulars which 

 ought to have been observed. It is 

 mal-observation when something is 

 not simply unseen, but seen wrong ; 

 when the fact or phenomenon, instead " 

 of being recognised for what it is 

 in reality, is mistaken for something 

 else. 



§ 2. Non-observation may either 

 take place by overlooking instances, 

 or by overlooking some of the cir- 

 cumstances of a given instance. If 

 we were to conclude that a fortune- 

 teller was a true prophet, from not 

 adverting to the cases in which his 

 predictions had been falsified by the 

 event, this would be non-observation 

 of instances ; but if we overlooked 

 or remained ignorant of the fact that 

 in cases where the predictions had 

 been fulfilled, he had been in collusion 

 with some one who had given him 

 the information on which they were 

 grounded, this would be non-observa- 

 tion of circumstances. 



The former case, in so far as the 

 act of induction from insufficient evi- 

 dence is concerned, does not fall under 

 this second class of Fallacies, but 

 under the third, Fallacies of Genera- 

 lisation. In every such case, however, 

 there are two defects or errors instead 

 of one : there is the error of treating 

 the insufficient evidence as if it were 

 sufficient, which is a Fallacy of the 

 third class ; and there is the insuffi- 

 ciency itself, the not having better 

 evidence ; which, when such evidence, 

 or, in other words, when other in- 

 stances, were to be had, is Non- 

 observation ; and the erroneous infer- 

 ence, so far as it is to be attributed ' 

 to this cause, is a Fallacy of the 

 second class. 



It belongs not to o\ir purpose to 

 treat of non-observation as arising 

 from casual inattention, from general 

 slovenliness of mental habits, want of 

 due practice in the use of the observ- 

 ing faculties, or insufficient interest 

 in the subject. The question per- 



