Si6 



fallacies; 



explanation of heat, light, or sensa- 

 tion ; or that th6 generic peculiarity 

 of those phenomena can be in the least 

 degree evaded by any such discoveries, 

 however well established. Let it be 

 shown, for instance, that the most 

 complex series of physical causes and 

 effects succeed one another in the eye 

 and in the brain to produce a sensa- 

 tion of colour ; rays falling on the eye, 

 refracted, converging, crossing one an- 

 other, making an inverted image on 

 the retina, and after this a motion — 

 let it be a vibration, or a rush of ner- 

 vous fluid, or whatever else you are 

 pleased to suppose, along the optic 

 nerve — a propagation of this motion 

 to the brain itself, and as many more 

 dififerent motions as you choose ; still 

 at the end of these motions there is 

 something which is not motion — there 

 is a feeling or sensation of colour. 

 Whatever number of motions we may 

 be able to interpolate, and whether 

 they be real or imaginary, we shall 

 still find, at the end of the series, a 

 motion antecedent and a colour con- 

 sequent. The mode in which any one 

 of the motions produces the next may 

 possibly be susceptible of explanation 

 by some general law of motion ; but 

 the mode in which the last motion 

 produces the sensation of colour can- 

 not be explained by any law of mo- 

 tion ; it is the law of colour, which 

 is, and must always remain, a peculiar 

 thing. Where our consciousness re- 

 cognises between two phenomena an 

 inherent distinction ; where we are 

 sensible of a difference which is not 

 merely of degree, and feel that no add- 

 ing one of the phenomena to itself 

 would produce the other ; any theory 

 which attempts to bring either under 

 the laws of the other must be false ; 

 though a theory which merely treats 

 the one as a cause or condition of the 

 other may possibly be true. 



§ 4. Among the remaining forms 

 of erroneoiis generalisation, several of 

 those most worthy of and most re- 

 quiring notice have fallen under our 

 examination in former places, where, 



in investigating the rules of correct 

 induction, we have had occasion to 

 advert to the distinction between it 

 and some common mode of the incor- 

 rect. In this number is what I have 

 formerly called the natural induction 

 of uninquiring minds, the induction 

 of the ancients, which proceeds 'per 

 ennmerationein simplicem : "This, that, 

 and the other A are B, I cannot think 

 of any A which is not B, therefore 

 every A is B." As a final condemna- 

 tion of this rude and slovenly mode 

 of generalisation, I will quote Bacon's 

 emphatic denunciation of it ; the most 

 important part, as I have more than 

 once ventured to assert, of the perma- 

 nent service rendered by him to philo- 

 sophy. " Inductio quae procedit per 

 enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis 

 est, et precario concludit," (concludes 

 only by yourleave, or provisionally,) " et 

 periculo exponitor ab instantia con- 

 tradictori^ et plerumque secundum 

 pauciora quam parest, et exhistantwn- 

 modoquceprcEsto sunt pronunciat. At ^m 

 Inductio quae ad inventionem et de- fl 

 monstrationem Scientiarum et Artium V 

 erit utilis, Naturam separare debet, per 

 rejectiones et exclusiones debitas ; ac 

 deinde post negativas tot quot suffi- 

 ciunt, super affirmativas concludere." 



I have already said that the mode h 

 of Simple Enumeration is still the flj 

 common and received method of In- ™l 

 duction in whatever relates to man 

 and society. Of this a very few in- 

 stances, more by way of memento than 

 of instruction, may suffice. What, 

 for example, is to be thought of all 

 the " common - sense " maxims for 

 which the following may serve as the 

 universal formula, "Whatsoever has 

 never been, will never be " ? As, for 

 example : Negroes have never been as 

 civilised as whites sometimes are, 

 therefore it is impossible they should 

 be so. Women, as a class, are sup- 

 posed not to have hitherto been equal 

 in intellect to men, therefore they are 

 necessarily inferior. Society cannot 

 prosper without this or the other insti- 

 tution ; e.g, in Aristotle's time, with- 

 out slavery ; in later times, without 



