524 



FALLACIES. 



Cicero, towards the end of his Fourth 

 Book De Finibus, states some of these 

 as follows. "Ut inquit, in fidibus 

 pliirimis, si nulla earum ita contenta 

 numeris sit, ut concentum servare 

 possit, omnes aequo incontentae sunt ; 

 sic peccata, quia discrepant, seque 

 discrepant ; paria sunt igitur." To 

 which Cicero himself aptly answers, 

 " aequo contingit omnibus fidibus, ut 

 incontentae sint ; illud non continuo, 

 ut aeque incontentae." The Stoic re- 

 sumes : " Ut enim, inquit, gubernator 

 aeque peccat, si palearum navem ever- 

 tit, et si auri ; item seque peccat qui 

 parentem, et qui servum, injuria ver- 

 berat ; " assuming, that because the 

 magnitude of the interest at stake 

 makes no difference in the mere de- 

 fect of skill, it can make none in the 

 moral defect : a false analogy. Again, 

 " Quis ignorat, si plures ex alto emer- 

 gere velint, propius fore eos quidem 

 ad respirandum, qui ad summam 

 jam aquam appropinquant, sed nihilo 

 magis respirare posse, quam eos, qui 

 sunt in profundo ? Nihil ergo adju- 

 vat procedere, et progi'edi in virtute, 

 quominus miserrimus sit, antequam 

 ad earn pervenerit, quoniam in aqu4 

 nihil adjuvat : et quoniam catuli, qui 

 jam despecturi sunt, caeci aeque, et ii 

 qui modo nati ; Platonem quoque ne- 

 cesse est, quoniam nondum videbat 

 sapientiam, aeque caecum animo, ac 

 Phalarim fuisse." Cicero, in his own 

 person, combats these false analogies 

 by other analogies tending to an 

 opposite conclusion. "Ista similia 

 non sunt, Cato. .... Ilia sunt sim- 

 ilia ; hebes acies est cuipiam ocu- 

 lorum : corpore alius languescit : hi 

 curatione adhibitd levantur in dies : 

 alter valet plus quotidie : alter videt. 

 Hi similes sunt omnibus, qui virtuti 

 student; levantur vitiis, levantur erro- 

 ribus." 



§ 7. In these and all other argu- 

 ments drawn from remote analogies, 

 and from metaphors, which are cases 

 of analogy, it is apparent (especially 

 when we consider the extreme facility 

 of raising iip contrary analogies and 



conflicting metaphors) that so far from 

 the metaphor or analogy proving any- 

 thing, the applicability of the meta- 

 phor is the very thing to be made 

 out. It has to be shown that in the 

 two cases asserted to be analogous, 

 the same law is really operating ; 

 that between the known resemblance 

 and the inferred one there is some 

 connection by means of causation. 

 Cicero and Cato might have bandied 

 opposite analogies for ever ; it rested 

 with each of them to prove by just 

 induction, or at least to render pro- 

 bable, that the case resembled the 

 one set of analogous cases and not 

 the other, in the circumstances on 

 which the disputed question really 

 hinged. Metaphors, for the most 

 part, therefore, assume the proposi- 

 tion which they are brought to prove : 

 their use is, to aid the apprehension 

 of it ; to make clearly and vividly 

 comprehended what it is that the 

 person who employs the metaphor is 

 proposing to make out ; and some- 

 times also, by what media he pro- 

 poses to do so. For an apt metaphor, 

 though it cannot prove, often suggests 

 the proof. 



For instance, when D'Alembert (I 

 believe) remarked that in certain 

 governments, only two creatures find 

 their way to the highest places, the 

 eagle and the serpent ; the metaphor 

 not only conveys with great vividness 

 the assertion intended, but contributes 

 towards substantiating it, by suggest- 

 ing, in a lively manner, the means by 

 which the two opposite charactersthus 

 typified effect their I'ise. When it is 

 said that a certain person misunder- 

 stands another because the lesser of 

 two objects cannot comprehend the 

 greater, the application of what is 

 true in the literal sense of the word 

 comprehend, to its metaphorical sense, 

 points to the fact which is the ground 

 and justification of the assertion, viz. 

 that one mind cannot thoroughly 

 understand another unless it can con- 

 tain it in itself, that is, unless it pos- 

 sesses all that is contained in the 

 other. When it is urged as an argu- 



