FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 



531 



really exist ; for * presumption * is 

 commonly used to express a kind 

 of slight suspicion ; whereas, to ' pre- 

 sume ' amounts to actual belief. There 

 are innumerable instances of a non- 

 correspondence in paronymous words, 

 similar to that above instanced ; as 

 between art and artful, design and 

 designing, faith BXid faithful , &c.: and 

 the more slight the variation of the 

 meaning, the more likely is the fal- 

 lacy to be successful ; for when the 

 words have become so widely removed 

 in sense as 'pity' and 'pitiful,' every 

 one would perceive such a fallacy, nor 

 would it be employed but in jest* 



"The present Fallacy is nearly 

 allied to, or rather, perhaps, may be 

 regarded as a branch of, that founded 

 on etymology ; viz. when a terra is 

 used at one time in its customary, 

 and at another in its etymological 

 sense. Perhaps no example of this 

 can be found that is more extensively 

 and mischievously employed than in 

 the case of the word representative: 

 assuming that its right meaning must 

 correspond exactly with the strict and 

 original sense of the verb * represent,' 

 the sophist persuades the multitude 

 that a member of the House of Com- 

 mons is bound to be guided in all 

 points by the opinion of his constitu- 

 ents ; and, in short, to be merely their 

 spokesman; whereas law and custom, 

 which in this case may be considered 



" scarcity of money." In the language 

 of commerce "money" has two mean- 

 ings : currency, or the circulating 

 medium ; and capital seeking invest- 

 ment, especially investment on loan. 

 In tills last sense the word is used 

 when the " money market " is spoken 

 of, and when the " value of money " 

 is said to be high or low, the rate 

 of interest being meant. The con- 

 sequence of this an)biguity is, that as 

 soon as scarcity of money in the latter 

 of these senses begins to be felt, — as 

 soon as there is difficulty of obtaining 

 loans, and the rate of interest is high, 

 — it is concluded that this must arise 

 from causes acting upon the quantity 

 of money in the other and more popu- 

 lar sense ; that the circulating medium 

 must have diminished in quantity, or 

 ought to be increased. I am aware 

 that, independently of the double 

 meaning of the term, there are in the 

 facts themselves some peculiarities, 

 giving an apparent support to this 

 error ; but the ambiguity of the lan- 

 guage stands on the very threshold 

 of the subject, and intercepts all at- 

 tempts to throw light upon it. 



Another ambiguous expression 

 which continually meets us in the 

 political controversies of the present 

 time, especially in those which relate 

 to organic changes, is the phrase "in- 

 fluence of property," which is some- 

 times used for the influence of respect 



as fixing the meaning of the term, { for superior intelligence, or gratitude 

 require no such thing, but enjoin the for the kind offices which persons of 

 representative to act according to the 

 best of his own judgment, and on his 

 own responsibility." 



The following are instances of great 

 practical imporlance, in which argu- 

 ments are habitually founded on a 

 verbal ambiguity. 



The mercantile public are frequently 

 led into this fallacy by the phrase 



* An example of this fallacy is the popu- 

 lar erior that strong drink must be a cause 

 of strenfjth. There is here fallacy with- 

 in fallacy ; for granting that the words 

 "strong-" and "strength" were not (as 

 they are) applied in a totally different 

 sense to fermented liquors and to the hu- 

 man body, there would still be involved 



large property have it so much m 

 their power to bestow ; at other times 

 for the influence of fear ; fear of the 

 worst sort of power, which large pro- 

 perty also gives to its possessor, the 

 power of doing mischief to depen- 

 dents. To confound these two is the 

 standing fallacy of ambiguity brought 

 against those who seek to purify the 



the error of sur^posing that an eflfect must 

 be like its cause ; that the conriiTioiis of a 

 phenomenon are likely to resemble the 

 phenomenon itself; wiiich we have already 

 treated of as an a priori fallacy of tlie first 

 rank. As well might it be .--upposed thut 

 a strong poison would make the person 

 who takes it strong. 



