FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 



539 



guage. This is a very frequent mode, 

 not only of pretended proof, but of 

 pretended explanation, and is paro- 

 died when Moli^re makes one of his 

 absurd physicians say — 



" Mihi k docto doctore, 



Doiutmdatur causam et rationem 

 qiiare 

 Opium facit dormire. 



A qnoi respuudeo, 



Quia est in eo 



Virtus doimitiva, 

 Cujus est iiatura 



Sensua assoupire." 



The words Nature and Essence are 

 grand instruments of this mode of 

 begging the question ; as in the well- 

 known argument of the scholastic 

 theologians, that the mind thinks 

 always, because the essence of the 

 mind is to think. Locke had to 

 point out that if by essence is here 

 meant some property which must 

 manifest itself by actual exercise at 

 all times, the premise is a direct as- 

 sumption of the conclusion ; while if 

 it only means that to think is the 

 distinctive property of a mind, there 

 is no connection between the premise 

 and the conclusion, since it is not 

 necessary that a distinctive property 

 should be perpetually in action. 



The following is one of the modes 

 in which these abstract terms. Nature 

 and Essence, are used as instruments 

 of this fallacy. Some particular pro- 

 perties of a thing are selected, more 

 or less arbitrarily, to be termed its 

 nature or essence ; and when this 

 has been done, these properties are 

 supposed to be invested with a kind 

 of indefeasibleness, to have become 

 paramoxmt to all the other properties 

 of the thing, and incapable of being 

 prevailed over or counteracted by 

 them. As when Aristotle, in a pas- 

 sage already cited, "decides that 

 there is no void on such arguments 

 as this ; in a void there could be no 

 difference of up and down ; for as in 

 nothing there are no differences, so 

 there are none in a privation or nega- 

 tion ; but a void is merely a privation 

 or negation of matter ; therefore, in a 

 void, bodie» could not move up and 



down, which it is in their nature to 

 do." * In other words, it is in the 

 natu7'e of bodies to move up and 

 down, ergo any physical fact which 

 supposes them not so to move can- 

 not be authentic. This mode of rea- 

 soning, by which a bad generalisation 

 is made to overrule all facts which 

 contradict it, is petitto principii in 

 one of its most palpable forms. 



None of the modes of assuming 

 what should be proved are in more 

 frequent use than what are termed 

 by Bentham "question- begging ap- 

 pellatives," names which beg the 

 question under the disguise of stating 

 it. The most potent of these are 

 such as have a laudatory or vitupe- 

 rative character. For instance, in 

 politics, the word Innovation. The 

 dictionary meaning of this term being 

 merely "a change to something new," 

 it is difficult for the defenders even 

 of the most salutary improvement to 

 deny that it is an innovation ; yet 

 the word having acquired in common 

 usage a vituperative connotation in 

 addition to its dictionary meaning, 

 the admission is always construed as 

 a large concession to the disadvan- 

 tage of the thing proposed. 



The following passage from the 

 argument in refutation of the Epicu- 

 reans, in the second book of Cicero de 

 Finibus, affords a fine example of this 

 sort of fallacy : — '* Et quidem illud 

 ipsum non nin>ium probo (et tantum 

 patior) philosophum loqui de cupidi- 

 tatibus finiendis. An potest cupiditas 

 finiri ? toUenda est, atque extrahenda 

 radicitus. Quis est enim, in quo sit 

 cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici 

 possit ? Ergo et avarus erit, sed finite : 

 adulter, verum habebit modum : et 

 luxuriosus eodem modo. Qualis ista 

 philosophia est, quae non interitum 

 afferat pravitatis, sed sit contenta 

 mediocritate vitiorum?" The ques- 

 tion was, whether certain desires, 

 when kept within bounds, are vices 

 or not ; and the argument decides the 

 point by applying to them a word 



» Hisi. Ind. Sc, 1. 34. 



