542 



FALLACIES. 



of society, on a supposed social com- 

 pact. I waive the consideration of 

 the fictitious nature of the compact 

 itself ; but when Hobbes, through 

 the whole Leviathan, elaborately de- 

 duces the obligation of obeying the 

 sovereign, not from the necessity or 

 utility of doing so, but inmi a pro- 

 mise supposed to have been made by 

 our ancestors, on renouncing savage 

 life and agreeing to establish political 

 society, it is impossible not to retort 

 by the question, why are we bound 

 to keep a promise made for us by 

 others, or why bound to keep a pro- 

 mise at all ? No satisfactory ground 

 can be assigned for the obligation, 

 except the mischievous consequences 

 of the absence of faith and mutual 

 confidence among mankind. We are, 

 therefore, brought round to the in- 

 terests of society, as the ultimate 

 ground of the obligation of a pro- 

 mise ; and yet those interests are not 

 admitted to be a sufficient justifica- 

 tion for the existence of government 

 and law. Without a promise it is 

 thought that we should not be bound 

 to that which is implied in all modes 

 of living in society, namely, to yield a 

 general obedience to the laws therein 

 established ; and so necessary is the 

 promise deemed, that if none has 

 actually been made, some additional 

 safety is supposed to be given to the 

 foundations of society by feigning 



§ 3. Two principal subdivisions of 

 the class of Fallacies of Confusion 

 having been disposed of, there re- 

 mains a third, in which the c<mfusion 

 is not, as in the Fallacy of Ambiguity, 

 in misconceiving the import of the 

 premises, nor as in Petitio Principii, 

 in forgetting what the premises are, 

 but in mistaking the conclusion which 

 is to be proved. This is the fallacy 

 of Ignoratio Elenchi, in the widest 

 sense of the phrase ; also called by 

 Archbishop Whately the Fallacy of 

 Irrelevant Conclusion. His examples 

 and remarks are highly worthy of 

 citation. 



" Various kinds of propositions are, 

 according to the occasion, substituted 

 for the one of which proof is required : 

 sometimes the particular for the uni- 

 versal ; someiimes a proposition with 

 different terms ; and various are tlie 

 contrivances employed to effect and 

 to conceal this substitution, and to 

 make the conclusion which the sophist 

 has drawn answer practically the 

 same purpose as the one he oiight 

 to have established. We say, 'prac- 

 tically the same purpose,' because it 

 will very often happen that some 

 emotion will be excited, some senti- 

 ment impressed on the mind, (by a 

 dexterous employment of this fallacy,) 

 such as shall bring men into the dis- 

 position requisite for your purpose ; 

 though they may not have assented 

 to, or even stated distinctly in their 

 own minds, the proposition which it 

 was your business to establish. Thus 

 if a sophist has to defend one who 

 has been guilty of some serious offence, 

 which he wishes to extenuate, though 

 he is unable distinctly to prove that 

 it is not such, yet if he can succeed 

 in making the audience laugh at some 

 casual matter, he has gained practi- 

 cally the same point. So also if any 

 one has pointed out the extenuating 

 circumstances in some particular case 

 of offence so as to show that it differs 

 widely from the generality of the same 

 class, the sophist, if he finds himself 

 unable to disprove these circum- 

 stances, may do away the force of 

 them by simply referring the action 

 to that very class which no one can 

 deny that it belongs to, and the very 

 name of which will excite a feeling of 

 disgust sufficient to counteract the 

 extenuation : e.g. let it be a case of 

 peculation, and that many mitigating 

 circumstances have been brought for- 

 ward which cannot be denied ; the 

 sophistical opponent will reply, 'Well, 

 but after all, the man is a rogue, and 

 there is an end of it ; ' now in reality 

 this was (by hypothesis) never the 

 question ; and the mere assertion of 

 what was never denied ought not, in 

 fairness, to be regarded as decisive : 



