BOOK VI. 



ON THE LOGIC OF THE MOEAL 

 SCIENCES. 



•• SI ITiomme peut predire, avec une assurance presqiie entiire, les ph^nomines dont 

 il connait lea lois ; si lors meme qu'elles lui sont inconnues, il pent, d'aprba I'exp^ri- 

 ence, prevoir avec une grande prooabilite les eveneniena de I'aveiur; pourqiioi regar* 

 derait-on comme une eutreprise chim^rique, celle de tracer avec quelque vrai>eniblance 

 le tableau des destinies futures de I'esj^ce humauie, d'apres les idsultats de son hi»- 

 toire? Le seul fondement de croyance dans les sciences naturelles, est cette id6e, 

 que les loia generates, connues ou iguor^es, qui rfeglent les phenonifenes de I'univers, 

 sont n^ces.-aires et constantes ; et p,.r quelle rai-on ce principe serait-il m<'ins vrai 

 pour le developpement des facult^s intellectuelles et morales de rhomme, que pour 

 les autres operations, de la nature? Enfin, puisque des opinions fornixes dapifesl'ex- 

 p6rience . . . sont )a seule rfegle de la conduite des honimes les plus sages, pourquoi 

 Interdirait-on an philosophy d'appuyer ses conjectures sur cette mfiine base, pourvu 

 qu'il ne leur attribue pas une certitude sup^rieure ^ celle qui pout maitre du nonibre, 

 de la Constance, de I'exactitude des observations ? "—Condorcjct, Eiquitit d'wn Tabltayi, 

 Historique des Progrh de V Esprit Haniain. 



CHAPTER I. 



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 



§ 1. Principles of Evidence and 

 Theories of Method are not to be 

 constructed d prioiH, The laws of 

 our rational faculty, like those of 

 every other natural agency, are only 

 learnt by seeing the agent at work. 

 The earlier achievements of science 

 were made without the conscious ob- 

 servance of any Scientific Method ; 

 and we should never have known by 

 what process truth is to be ascertained 

 if we had not previously ascertained 

 many truths. But it was only the 

 easier problems which could be thus 

 resolved : natural sagacity, when it 

 tried its strength ag:ain.st the more 

 difficult ones, either failed altogether, 

 or if it succeeded here and there in 

 obtaining a solution, had no sure 

 means of convincing others that its 



solution was correct. In scientific 

 investigation, as in all other v/orks of 

 human skill, the way of obtaining the 

 end is seen as it were instinctively by 

 superior minds in some comparatively 

 simple case, and is then, by judicious 

 generalisation, adapted to the variety 

 of complex cases. We learn to do 

 a thing in difficult circumstances by 

 attending to the manner in which 

 we have spontaneously done the same 

 thing in easier ones. 



This truth is exemplified by the 

 history of the various branches of 

 knowledge which have successively, 

 in the ascending oider of their com- 

 plication, assumed the character of 

 sciences ; and will doubtless receive 

 fresh confirmation from those of which 

 the final scientific constitution is yet 

 to come, and which are still aban- 

 doned to the uncertainties of vague 

 and popular discussion. Although 



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