LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 



551 



Were he desirous of altogether throw- 

 ing them off, there would not be re- 

 quired for that purpose a stronger 

 desire than he knows himself to be 

 capable of feeling. It is of course 

 necessary, to render our consciousness 

 of freedom complete, that we should 

 have succeeded in making our char- 

 acter all we have hitherto attempted 

 to make it ; for if we have wished 

 and not attained, we have, to that 

 extent, not power over our own char- 

 acter — we are not free. Or at least, 

 we must feel that our wish, if not 

 strong enough to alter our character, 

 is strong enough to conquer our char- 

 acter when the two are brought into 

 conflict in any particular case of con- 

 duct. And hence it is said with truth, 

 that none but a person of confirmed 

 virtue is completely free. 



The application of so improper a 

 term as Necessity to the doctrine of 

 cause and effect in the matter of 

 human character seems to me one 

 of the most signal instances in philo- 

 sophy of the abuse of terms, and its 

 practical conseqiiences one of the 

 most striking examples of the power 

 of language over our associations. 

 The subject will never be generally 

 understood until that objectionable 

 term is dropped. The free-will doc- 

 trine, by keeping in view precisely 

 that portion of the truth which the 

 word Necessity puts out of sight, 

 namely, the power of the mind to 

 co-operate in the formation of its own 

 character, has given to its adherents 

 a practical feeling much nearer to the 

 truth than has generally (I believe) 

 existed in the minds of Necessitarians. 

 The latter may have had a stronger 

 sense of the importance of what human 

 beings can do to shape the characters 

 of one another ; but the free-will doc- 

 trine has, I believe, fostered in its 

 supporters a much stronger spirit of 

 self -culture. 



§ 4. There is still one fact which 

 requires to be noticed (in addition to 

 the existence of a power of self-forma- 

 tion) before the doctrine of the causa- 



tion of human actions can be freed 

 from the confusion and misapprehen- 

 sions which surround it in many 

 minds. When the will is said to be 

 determined by motives, a motive does 

 not mean always, or solely, the anti- 

 cipation of a pleasure or of a pain. 

 I shall not here inquire whether it be 

 true that, in the commencement, all 

 our voluntary actions are mere means 

 consciously employed to obtain some 

 pleasure or avoid some pain. It is 

 at least certain that we gradually, 

 thnmgh the influence of association, 

 come to desire the means without 

 thinking of the end : the action itself 

 becomes an object of desire, and is 

 performed without reference to any 

 motive beyond itself. Thus far, it 

 may still be objected, that the action 

 having through association become 

 pleasurable, we are, as much as be- 

 fore, moved to act by the anticipa- 

 tion of a pleasure, namely, the pleasure 

 of the action itself. But granting 

 this, the matter does not end here. 

 As we proceed in the formation of 

 habits, and become accustomed to 

 will a particular act or a particular 

 course of conduct because it is pleasur- 

 able, we at last continue to will it 

 without any reference to its being 

 pleasurable. Although, from some 

 change in us or in our circumstances, 

 we have ceased to find any pleasure 

 in the action, or perhaps to anticipate 

 any pleasure as the consequence of it, 

 we still continue to desire the action, 

 and consequently to do it. In this 

 manner it is that habits of hurtful 

 excess continue to be practised al- 

 though the}' have ceased to be plea- 

 surable ; and in this manner also it 

 is that the habit of willing to per- 

 severe in the course which he has 

 chosen does not desert the moral 

 hero, even when the reward, however 

 real, which he doubtless receives from 

 the consciousness of well-doing, is 

 anything but an equivalent for the 

 sufferings he undergoes or the wishes 

 which he may have to renounce. 



A habit of willing is commonly 

 called a purpose ; and among the 



