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LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



tion of material mechanism ; whether 

 we have organs of thought and of emo- 

 tion in the same sense in which we 

 have organs of sensation. Many emi- 

 nent physiologists hold the affirma- 

 tive. These contend that a thought 

 (for example) is as much the result of 

 nervous agency as a sensation ; that 

 some particular state of our nervous 

 system, in particular of that central 

 portion of it called the brain, invari- 

 ably precedes, and is presupposed by, 

 every state of our consciousness. Ac- 

 cording to this theory, one state of mind 

 is never really produced by another ; 

 all are produced by states of body. 

 When one thought seems to call up 

 another by association, it is not really 

 a thought which recalls a thought ; the 

 association did not exist between the 

 two thoughts, but between the two 

 states of the brain or nerves which 

 preceded the thoughts : one of those 

 states recalls the other, each being at- 

 tended, in its passage, by the particu- 

 lar state of consciousness which is con- 

 sequent on it. On this theory the uni- 

 formities of succession among states 

 of mind would be mere derivative 

 uniformities, resulting from the laws 

 of succession of the bodily states 

 which cause them. There would be 

 no original mental laws, no Laws 

 of Mind in the sense in which I use 

 the term, at all ; and mental science 

 would be a mere branch, though the 

 highest and most recondite branch, of 

 the science of Physiology. M. Comte, 

 accordingly, claims the scientific cog- 

 nisance of moral and intellectual phe- 

 nomena exclusively for physiologists ; 

 and not only denies to Psychology, or 

 Mental Philosophy properly so called, 

 the character of a science, but places 

 it, in the chimerical nature of its ob- 

 jects and pretensions, almost on a par 

 with astrology. 



But, after all has been said which 

 can be said, it remains incontestable 

 that there exist uniformities of suc- 

 cession among states of mind, and 

 that these can be ascertained by ob- 

 servation and experiment. Further, 

 that every mental state has a nervous 



state for its immediate antecedent att 

 proximate cause, though extreme!; 

 probable, cannot hitherto be said 

 be proved, in the conclusive mann 

 in which this can be proved of sensa-" 

 tions ; and even were it certain, yet 

 every one must admit that we are 

 wholly ignorant of the characteristics 

 of these nervous states ; we kno\nr 

 not, and at present have no mea 

 of knowing, in what respect one ol 

 them differs from another ; and oi 

 only mode of studying their succes 

 sions or co-existences must be b 

 observing the successions and co-ex 

 istences of the mental states of whic- 

 they are supposed to be the generate: 

 or causes. The successions, therefoi 

 which obtain among mental pheno 

 mena do not admit of being dedu 

 from the physiological laws of o 

 nervous organisation ; and all rei 

 knowledge of them must continu 

 for a long time at least, if not alwa; 

 to be sought in the direct study, b; 

 observation and experiment, of th 

 mental successions themselves. Sin 

 therefore, the order of our menti 

 phenomena must be studied in th 

 phenomena, and not inferred froi 

 the laws of any phenomena moi 

 general, there is a distinct and se 

 rate Science of Mind. 



The relations, indeed, of that scieni 

 to the science of physiology must nev 

 be overlooked or imdervalued 

 must by no means be forgotten t 

 the laws of mind may be derivative 

 laws resulting from laws of ani 

 life, and that their truth therefo: 

 may ultimately depend on physic 

 conditions ; and the influence of physi 

 logical states or physiological chang( 

 in altering or counteracting the mei 

 tal successions is one of the most i 

 portant departments of psychologi 

 study. But, on the other hand, 

 reject the resource of psychological 

 analysis, and construct the theory of 

 the mind solely on such data as phy- 

 siology at present affords, seems to 

 me as great an error in principle, and 

 an even more serious one in practice. 

 Imperfect as is the science of mindf 



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