LAWS OF MIND. 



559 



the inquiry be into the origin of 

 moral feelings, the feeling, for ex- 

 ample, of moral reprobation, it is 

 necessary to compare all the varieties 

 of actions or states of mind which 

 are ever morally disapproved, and see 

 whether in all these cases it can be 

 shown, or reasonably surmised, that 

 the action or state of mind had be- 

 come connected by association, in the 

 disapproving mind, with some parti- 

 cular class of hateful or disgtisting 

 ideas ; and the method employed is, 

 thus far, that of Agreement. But 

 this is not enough. Supposing this 

 proved, we must try further by the 

 Method of Difference whether this 

 particular kind of hateful or disgust- 

 ing ideas, when it becomes associated 

 with an action previously indifferent, 

 will render that action a subject of 

 moral disapproval. If this question 

 can be answered in the affirmative, it 

 is shown to be a law of the human 

 mind that an association of that par- 

 ticular description is the generating 

 cause of moral reprobation. That all 

 this is the case has been rendered 

 extremely probable, but the experi- 

 ments have not been tried with the 

 degree of precision necessary for a 

 complete and absolutely conclusive in- 

 duction.* 



It is further to be remembered, that 

 even if all which this theory of mental 

 phenomena contends for could be 

 proved, we should not be the more 

 enabled to resolve the laws of the 

 more complex feelings into those of 

 the simpler ones. The generation of 

 one class of mental phenomena from 

 another, whenever it can be made out, 

 is a highly interesting fact in psy- 

 chological chemistry ; but it no more 

 supersedes the necessity of an experi- 



* In the case of the moral sentiments, 

 the place of direct expennient is to a con- 

 siderable extent supphed by historical ex- 

 perience, and we are able to trace with a 

 tolerable appronch to cer'ainty the parti- 

 cular associations by which those senti- 

 ments are engendered. This has been 

 attempted, so far as i-espects the senti- 

 ment of justice, in a httle work by the 

 present author, cuUtlfd Utilitarianurn, 



mental study of the generated pheno- 

 menon, than a knowledge of the 

 properties of oxygen and sulphur 

 enables us to deduce those of sulphuric 

 acid without specific observation and 

 experiment. Whatever, therefore, 

 may be the final issue of the attempt 

 to account for the origin of our judg- 

 ments, our desires, or our volitions, 

 from simpler mental phenomena, it,ia 

 not the less imperative to ascertain 

 the sequences of the complex pheno- 

 mena themselves by special study in 

 conformity to the canons of Induction, 

 Thus, in respect to Belief, psycho- 

 logists will always have to inquire 

 what beliefs we have by direct con- 

 sciousness, and according to what 

 laws one belief produces another ; 

 what are the laws in virtue of which 

 one thing is recognised by the mind, 

 either rightly or erroneously, as evi- 

 dence of another thing. Jn regard 

 to Desire, they will have to examine 

 what objects we desire naturally, and 

 by what causes we are made to desire 

 things originally indifferent, or even 

 disagreeable to us ; and so forth. It 

 may be remarked, that the general 

 laws of association prevail among 

 these more intricate states of mind, 

 in the same manner as among the 

 simpler ones. A desire, an emotion, 

 an idea of the higher order of abstrac- 

 tion, even our judgments and volitions 

 when they have become habitual, are 

 called up by association, according to 

 precisely the same laws as our simple 

 ideas. 



§ 4. In the course of these inquiries 

 it will be natural and necessary to 

 examine how far the production of 

 one state of mind by another is in- 

 fluenced by any assignable state of 

 body. The commonest observation 

 shows that different minds are sus- 

 ceptible in very different degrees to 

 the action of the same psychological 

 causes. The idea, for example, of a 

 given desirable object will excite in 

 different minds very different degrees 

 of intensity of desire. The same sub- 

 ject of meditation preseiited to differ- 



