564 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



individuals, it would be unreasonable 

 to expect that the empirical laws of 

 the human mind, the generalisations 

 which can be made respecting the 

 feelings or actions of mankind with- 

 out reference to the causes that de- 

 termine them, should be anything but 

 approximate generalisations. They 

 are the common wisdom of common 

 life, and as such are invaluable ; espe- 

 cially as they are mostly to be ap- 

 plied to cases not very dissimilar to 

 those from which they were collec- 

 ted. But when maxims of this sort, 

 collected from Englishmen, come to 

 be applied to Frenchmen, or when 

 those collected from the present day 

 are applied to past or future genera- 

 tions, they are apt to be very much 

 at fault. Unless we have resolved 

 the empirical law into the laws of the 

 causes on which it depends, and as- 

 certained that those causes extend to 

 the case which we have in view, there 

 can be no reliance placed in our infer- 

 ences. For every individual is sur- 

 rounded by circumstances different 

 from those of every other individual ; 

 every nation or generation of mankind 

 from every other nation or generation; 

 and none of these differences are with- 

 out their influence in forming a dif- 

 ferent type of character. There is, 

 indeed, also a certain general resem- 

 blance ; but peculiarities of circum- 

 stances are continually constituting 

 exceptions even to the propositions 

 which are true in the great majority 

 of cases. 



Although, however, there is scarcely 

 any mode of feeling or conduct which 

 is, in the absolute sense, common to 

 all mankind ; and though the genera- 

 lisations which assert that any given 

 variety of conduct or feeling will be 

 found universally, (however nearly 

 they may approximate to truth with- 

 in given limits of observation,) will 

 be considered as scientific propositions 

 by no one who is at all familiar with 

 scientific investigation ; yet all modes 

 of feeling and conduct met with among 

 mankind have causes which produce 

 them ; and in the propositions which 



assign those causes will be found the 

 explanation of the empirical laws, and 

 the limiting principle of our reliance 

 on them. Human beings do not all 

 feel and act alike in the same circum- 

 stances ; but it is possible to deter- 

 mine what makes one person, in a 

 given position, feel or act in one way, 

 another in another ; how any given 

 mode of feeling and conduct, com- 

 patible with the general laws (physi- 

 cal and mental) of human nature, has 

 been, or may be, formed. In other 

 words, mankind have not one univer- 

 sal character, but there exist universal 

 laws of the Formation of Character. 

 And since it is by these laws, com- 

 bined with the facts of each particular 

 case, that the whole of the phenomena 

 of human action and feeling are pro- 

 duced, it is on these that every rational 

 attempt to construct the science of 

 human nature in the concrete and for 

 practical purposes must proceed. 



§ 3. The laws, then, of the forma- 

 tion of character being the principal 

 object of scientific inquiry into human 

 nature, it remains to determine the 

 method of investigation best fitted for 

 ascertaining them. And the logical 

 principles according to which this 

 question is to be decided must be 

 those which preside over every other 

 attempt to investigate the laws of 

 very complex phenomena For it is 

 evident that both the character of any 

 human being, and the aggregate of 

 the circumstances by which that char- 

 acter has been formed, are facts of a 

 high order of complexity. Now to 

 such cases we have seen that the 

 Deductive Method, setting out from 

 general laws, and verifying their con- 

 sequences by specific experience, is 

 alone applicable. The grounds of this 

 great logical doctrine have formerly 

 been stated, and its truth will derive 

 additional support from a brief exami- 

 nation of the specialities of the present 

 case. 



There are only two modes in which 

 laws of nature can be ascertained : 

 deductively and experimentally, in- 



