):jTHOLOGY. 



S6? 



two kinds of evidence justifies lis in 

 believing that we have both reasoned 

 rightly and observed rightly. Our 

 observation, though not sufficient as 

 proof, is ample as verification. And 

 having ascertained not only the em- 

 pirical laws, but the causes of the 

 peculiarities, we need be under no 

 difficulty in judging how far they may 

 be expected to be permanent, or by 

 what circumstances they would be 

 modified or destroyed. 



§ 4. Since, then, it is impossible to 

 obtain really accurate propositions 

 respecting the formation of character 

 from observation and experiment 

 alone, we ar'^ driven perforce to that 

 which, ev?n if it had not been the in- 

 dispensable, would have been the most 

 perfect mode of investigation, and 

 which it is one of the principal aims 

 of philosophy to extend ; namely, that 

 which tries its experiments not on the 

 complex facts, but on the simple ones 

 of which they are compounded, and 

 after ascertaining the laws of the 

 causes, the composition of which gives 

 rise to the complex phenomena, then 

 considers whether these will not ex- 

 plain and account for the approxi- 

 mate generalisations which have been 

 framed empirically respecting the 

 sequences of those complex pheno- 

 mena. The laws of the formation of 

 character are, in short, derivative 

 laws, resulting from the general laws 

 of mind, and are to be obtained by 

 deducing them from those general 

 laws by supposing any given set of 

 circumstances, and then considering 

 what, according to the laws of mind, 

 will be the influence of those circum- 

 stances on the formation of character. 



A science is thus formed, to which 

 I would propose to give the name of 

 Ethology, or the Science of Char- 

 acter, from ^doi, a word more nearly 

 corresponding to the term " char- 

 acter," as I here use it, than any 

 other word in the same language. 

 The name is perhaps etymologically 

 applicable to the entire science of our 

 mental and moral nature ; but if, as 



is usual and convenient, we employ 

 the name Psychology for the science 

 of the elementary laws of mind, Etho- 

 logy will serve for the ulterior science 

 which determines the kind of char- 

 acter produced in conformity to those 

 general laws, by any set of circum- 

 stances, physical and moral. Accord- 

 ing to this definition, Ethology is the 

 science which corresponds to the act 

 of education, in the widest sense of 

 the term, including the formation of 

 national or collective character as 

 well as individual. It would indeed 

 be vain to expect (however completely 

 the laws of the formation of character 

 might be ascertained) that we could 

 know so accurately the circumstances 

 of any given case as to be able posi- 

 tively to predict the character that 

 would be produced in that case. But 

 we must remember that a degree of 

 knowledge far short of the power of 

 actual prediction is often of much 

 practical value. There may be great 

 power of influencing phenomena, with 

 a very imperfect knowledge of the 

 causes by which they are in any given 

 instance determined. It is enough 

 that we know that certain means have 

 a tendency to produce a given effect, 

 and that others have a tendency to 

 frustrate it. When the circumstances 

 of an individual or of a nation are in 

 any considerable degree under our 

 control, we may, by our knowledge 

 of tendencies, be enabled to shape 

 those circumstances in a manner much 

 more favourable to the ends we desire 

 than the shape which they would of 

 themselves assume. This is the limit 

 of our power, but within this limit 

 the power is a most important one. 



This science of Ethology may be 

 called the Exact Science of Human 

 Nature ; for its truths are not, like 

 the empirical laws which depend on 

 them, approximate generalisations, 

 but real laws. It is, however, (as 

 in all cases of complex phenomena,) 

 necessary to the exactness of the pro- 

 positions that they should be hypo- 

 thetical only, and affirm tendencies, 

 not facts. They must not assert that 



