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LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



in all its circumstances ; one may 

 agree with it in some of its circum- 

 stances, and another in the remainder. 

 And it may be argued, that if these 

 nations remain poorer than the re- 

 strictive nation, it cannot be for want 

 either of the first or of the second set 

 of circumstances, but it must be for 

 want of the protective system. If (we 

 might say) the restrictive nation had 

 prospered from the one set of causes, 

 the first of the free-trade nations 

 would have prospered equally : if, by 

 reason of the other, the second would : 

 but neither has : therefore the pros- 

 perity was owing to the restrictions. 

 This will be allowed to be a very 

 favourable specimen of an argument 

 from specific experience in politics, 

 and if this be inconclusive, it would 

 not be easy to find another preferable 

 to it. 



Yet that it is inconclusive scarcely 

 requires to be pointed out. Why must 

 the prosperous nation have prospered 

 from one cause exclusively ? National 

 prosperity is always the collective re- 

 sult of a multitude of favourable cir- 

 cumstances ; and of these, the restric- 

 tive nation may unite a greater num- 

 ber than either of the others, though 

 it may have all of those circumstances 

 in common with either one or the 

 other of them. Its prosperity may be 

 partly owing to circumstances common 

 to it with one of those nations, and 

 partly with the other, while they, 

 having each of them only half the 

 number of favourable circumstances, 

 have remained inferior. So that the 

 closest imitation which can be made 

 in the social science of a legitimate 

 induction from direct experience gives 

 but a specious semblance of conclusive- 

 ness, without any real value. 



§ 4. The Method of Difference in 

 either of its forms being thus com- 

 pletely out of the question, there re- 

 mains the Method of Agreement. 

 But we are already aware of how 

 little value this method is in cases 

 admitting Plurality of Causes ; and 

 social phenomena are those in which 



the plurality prevails in the utmost 

 possible extent. 



Suppose that the observer makes 

 the luckiest hit which could be given 

 by any conceivable combination of 

 chances : that he finds two nations 

 which agree in no circumstance what- 

 ever, except in having a restrictive 

 system and in being prosperous ; or 

 a number of nations, all prosperous, 

 which have no antecedent circum- 

 stances common to them all but that 

 of having a restrictive policy. It is 

 unnecessary to go into the considera- 

 tion of the impossibility of ascertaining 

 from history, or even from contempo- 

 rary observation, that such is really 

 the fact : that the nations agree in no 

 other circumstance capable of influ- 

 encing the case. Let us suppose this 

 impossibility vanquished, and the fact 

 ascertained that they agree only in a 

 restrictive system as an antecedent, 

 and industrial prosperity as a con- 

 sequent. What degree of presump- 

 tion does this raise, that the restric- 

 tive system caused the prosperity? 

 One so trifling as to be equivalent to 

 none at all. That some one antece- 

 dent is the cause of a given effect, 

 because all other antecedents have 

 been ioundT capable of being elimi- 

 nated, is a just inference only if the 

 effect can have but one cause. If it 

 admits of several, nothing is more na- 

 tural than that each of these should 

 separately admit of being eliminated. 

 Now, in the case of political pheno- 

 mena, the supposition of unity of cause 

 is not only wide of the truth, but at 

 an immeasurable distance from it. 

 The causes of every social phenome- 

 non which we are particularly inte- 

 rested about, security, wealth, freedom, 

 good government, public virtue, gene- 

 ral intelligence, or their opposites, are 

 infinitely numerous, especially the ex- 

 ternal or remote causes, which alone 

 are, for the most part, accessible to 

 direct observation. No one cause suf- 

 fices of itself to produce any of these 

 phenomena ; while there are countless 

 causes which have some influence over 

 them, and may co-operate either in 



