58o 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



by another, must for the present be 

 left out of consideration ; because in 

 them this error is complicated with, 

 and is the effect of another funda- 

 mental misconception, of which we 

 have already taken some notice, and 

 which will be further treated of before 

 we conclude. I speak of those who 

 deduce political conclusions not from 

 laws of nature, not from sequences of 

 phenomena, real or imaginary, but 

 from unbending practical maxims. 

 Such, for example, are all who found 

 their theory of politics on what is 

 called abstract right, that is to say, 

 on universal precepts ; a pretension of 

 which we have already noticed the 

 chimerical nature. Such, in like man- 

 ner, are those who make the assump- 

 tion of a social contract, or any other 

 kind of original obligation, and apply 

 it to particular cases by mere inter- 

 pretation. But in this the funda- 

 mental error is the attempt to treat an 

 art like a science, and to have a de- 

 ductive art ; the irrationality of which 

 will be shown in a future chapter. It 

 will be proper to take our exemplifica- 

 tion of the geometrical theory from 

 those thinkers who have avoided this 

 additional error, and who entertain, so 

 far, a juster idea of the nature of poli- 

 tical inquiry. 



We may cite, in the first instance, 

 those who assume as the principle of 

 their political philosophy that govern- 

 ment is founded on fear ; that the 

 dread of each other is the one motive 

 by which human beings were origin- 

 ally brought into a state of society, 

 and are still held in it. Some of the 

 earlier scientific inquirers into politics, 

 in particular Hobbes, assumed this 

 proposition, not by implication, but 

 avowedly, as the foundation of their 

 doctrine, and attempted to build a 

 complete philosophy of politics there- 

 upon. It is true that Hobbes did not 

 find this one maxim sufficient to carry 

 him through the whole of his subject, 

 but was obliged to eke it out by the 

 double sophism of an original con- 

 tract. I call this a double sophism ; 

 first, as passing off a fiction for a fact. 



and, secondly, assuming a practical 

 principle! or precept as the basis of a 

 theory ; which is a petitio pnncipii, 

 since (as we noticed in treating of that 

 Fallacy) every rule of conduct, even 

 though it be so binding a one as the 

 observance of a promise, must rest its 

 own foundations on the theory of the 

 subject, and the theory, therefore, can- 

 not rest upon it. 



§ 3. Passing over less important in- 

 stances, I shall come at once to the 

 most remarkable example afforded by 

 our own times of the geometrical me- 

 thod in politics ; emanating from per- 

 sons who are well aware of the dis- 

 tinction between science and art ; who 

 knew that rules of conduct must fol- 

 low, not precede, the ascertainment of 

 laws of nature, and that the latter, 

 not the former, is the legitimate field 

 for the application of the deductive 

 method. I allude to the interest- 

 philosophy of the Bentham school. 



The profound and original thinkers 

 who are commonly known under this 

 description, founded their general 

 theory of government on one compre- 

 hensive premise, namely, that men's 

 actions are always determined by their 

 interests. There is an ambiguity in 

 this last expression ; for, as the same 

 philosophers, especially Bentham, gave 

 the name of an interest to anything 

 which a person likes, the proposition 

 may be understood to mean only this, 

 that men's actions are always deter- 

 mined by their wishes. In this sense, 

 however, it would not bear out any of 

 the consequences which these writers 

 drew from it ; and the word, there- 

 fore, in their political reasonings, must 

 be understood to mean (which is also 

 the explanation they themselves, on 

 such occasions, gave of it) what is 

 commonly termed private or worldly 

 interest. 



Taking the doctrine, then, in this 

 sense, an objection presents itself in 

 limine which might be deemed a fatal 

 one, namely, that so sweeping a proposi- 

 tion is far from being universally true. 

 Human beings are not governed in all 



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