THE GEOMETRICAL METaoD. 



58« 



their actions by their worldly interests. 

 This, however, is by no means so con- 

 clusive an objection as it at first ap- 

 pears ; because in politics we are for 

 the most part concerned with the con- 

 duct, not of individual persons, but 

 either of a series of persons (as a suc- 

 cession of kings), or a body or mass 

 of persons, as a nation, an aristocracy, 

 or a representative assembly. And 

 whatever is true of a large majority 

 of mankind, may without much error 

 be taken for true of any succession of 

 persons, considered as a whole, or of 

 any collection of persons in which the 

 act of the majority becomes the act of 

 the whole body. Although, therefore, 

 the maxim is sometimes expressed in a 

 manner unnecessarily paradoxical, the 

 consequences drawn from it will hold 

 equally good if the assertion be limited 

 as follows : Any succession of persons, 

 or the majority of any body of per- 

 sons, will be governed in the bulk of 

 their conduct by their personal inte- 

 rests. We are bound to allow to this 

 school of thinkers the benefit of this 

 more rational statement of their funda- 

 mental maxim, which is also in strict 

 conformity to the explanations which, 

 when considered to be called for, have 

 been given by themselves. 



The theory goes on to infer, quite 

 correctly, that if the actions of man- 

 kind are determined in the main by 

 their selfish interests, the only rulers 

 who will govern according to the in- 

 terest of the governed are those whose 

 selfish interests are in accordance with 

 it. And to this is added a third pro- 

 position, namely, that no rulers have 

 their selfish interest identical with 

 that of the governed, unless it be ren- 

 dered so by accountability, that is, by 

 dependence on the will of the governed. 

 In other words (and as the result of 

 the whole), that the desire of retain- 

 ing or the fear of losing their power, 

 and whatever is thereon consequent, 

 is the sole motive which can be relied 

 on for producing on the part of rulers 

 a course of conduct in accordance with 

 the general interest. 



We have thus a fundamental theo- 



rem of political science, consisting of 

 three syllogisms, and depending chiefly 

 on two general premises, in each of 

 which a certain effect is considered as 

 determined only by one cause, not by 

 a concurrence of causes. In the one, 

 it is assumed that the actions of ave- 

 rage rulers are determined solely by 

 self-interest ; in the other, that the 

 sense of identity of interest with the 

 governed, is produced and producible 

 by no other cause than responsibility. 



Neither of these propositions is by 

 any means true ; the last is extremely 

 wide of the truth. 



It is not true that the actions even 

 of average rulers are wholly, or any- 

 thing approaching to wholly, deter- 

 mined by their personal interest, or 

 even by their own opinion of their 

 personal interest. I do not speak of 

 the influence of a sense of duty, or 

 feelings of philanthropy, motives never 

 to be mainly relied on, though (except 

 in countries or during periods of great 

 moral debasement) they influence al- 

 most all rulers in some degree, and 

 some rulers in a very great degree. 

 But I insist only on what is true of 

 all rulers, viz. that the character and 

 course of their actions is largely in- 

 fluenced (independently of personal 

 calculation) by the habitual senti- 

 ments and feelings, the general mod^s 

 of thinking and acting, which prevail 

 throughout the community of which 

 they are members, as well as by the 

 feelings, habits and modes of thought 

 which characterise the particular class 

 in that community to which they 

 themselves belong. And no one will 

 understand or be able to decipher 

 their system of conduct who does not 

 take all these things into account. 

 They are also much influenced by the 

 maxims and traditions which have 

 descended to them from other rulers, 

 their predecessors ; which maxims 

 and traditions have been known to 

 retain an ascendancy during long 

 periods, even in opposition to the pri- 

 vate interests of the rulers for the 

 time being. I put aside the influence 

 of other less general causes. Although, 



