6o4 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



too great a distance from the elemen- 

 tary laws of human nature on which 

 they depend, — too many links inter- 

 vene, and the concurrence of causes 

 at each link is far too complicated, — 

 to enable these propositions to be pre- 

 gented as direct corollaries from those 

 elementary principles. They have, 

 therefore, in the minds of most in- 

 quirers, remained in the state of em- 

 pirical laws, applicable only within 

 the bounds of actual observation, 

 without any means of determining 

 their real limits, and of judging 

 whether the changes which have 

 hitherto been in progress are destined 

 to continue indefinitely, or to termi- 

 nate', or even to be reversed. 



§ 7. In order to obtain better em- 

 pirical laws, we must not rest satisfied 

 with noting the progressive changes 

 which manifest themselves in the 

 separate elements of society, and in 

 which nothing is indicated but the 

 relation of fragments of the effect to 

 corresponding fragments of the cause. 

 It is necessary to combine the statical 

 view of social phenomena with the 

 dynamical, considering not only the 

 progressive changes of the different 

 elements, but the contemporaneous 

 condition of each, and thus obtain 

 empirically the law of correspondence 

 not only between the simultaneous 

 states, but between the simultaneous 

 changes, of those elements. This law 

 of correspondence it is which, duly 

 verified d prion, would become the 

 real scientific derivative law of the 

 development of humanity and human 

 affairs. 



In the difficult process of observa- 

 tion and comparison which is here re- 

 quired, it would evidently be a great 

 assistance if it should happen to be 

 the fact that some one element in 

 the complex existence of social man is 

 pre-eminent over all others as the 

 prime agent of the social movement. 

 For we could then take the progress 

 of that one element as the central 

 chain, to each successive link of which 

 the corresponding links of all the 



other progressions being appended, 

 the succession of the facts would by 

 this alone be presented in a kind of 

 spontaneous order, far more nearly 

 approaching to the real order of their 

 filiation than could be obtained by 

 any other merely empirical process. 



Now, the evidence of history and 

 that of human nature combine, by a 

 striking instance of consilience, to 

 show that there really is one social 

 element which is thus predominant, 

 and almost paramount, among the 

 agents of the social progression. This 

 is the state of the speculative faculties 

 of mankind, including the nature of 

 the beliefs which by any means they 

 have arrived at concerning themselves 

 and the world by which they are sur- 

 rounded. 



It would be a great error, and one 

 very little likely to be committed, to 

 assert that speculation, intellectual 

 activity, the pursuit of truth, is among 

 the more powerful propensities of 

 human nature, or hold a predominat- 

 ing place in the lives of any, save 

 decidedly exceptional, individuals. 

 But, notwithstanding the relative 

 weakness of this principle among 

 other sociological agents, its influence 

 is the main determining cause of the 

 social progress ; all the other disposi- 

 tions of our nature which contribute 

 to that progress being dependent on 

 it for the means of accomplishing their 

 share of the work. Thus (to take the 

 most obvious case first) the impelling 

 force to most of the improvements 

 effected in the arts of life is the 

 desire of increased material comfort ; 

 but as we can only act upon external 

 objects in proportion to our knowledge 

 of them, the state of knowledge at any 

 time is the limit of the industrial im- 

 provements possible at that time ; and 

 the progress of industry must follow, 

 and depend on, the progress of know- 

 ledge. The same thing may be shown 

 to be true, though it is not quite so 

 obvious, of the progress of the fine 

 arts. Further, as the strongest pro- 

 pensities of uncultivated or half -culti- 

 vated human nature (being the purely 



i 



