6o6 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCEa 



the Historical Method. Without dis- 

 cussing here the worth of his conclu- 

 sions, and especially of his predictions 

 and recommendations with respect to 

 the Future of society, which appear 

 to me greatly inferior in value to his 

 appreciation of the Past, I shall con- 

 fine myself to mentioning one impor- 

 tant generalisation, which M. Conite 

 regards as the fundamental law of the 

 progress of human knowledge. Specu- 

 lation he conceives to have, on every 

 subject of human inquiry, three suc- 

 cessive stagss ; in the first of which 

 it tends to explain the phenomena by 

 supernatural agencies, in the second 

 by metaphysical abstractions, and in 

 the third or final state confines itself 

 to ascertaining their laws of succes- 

 sion and similitude. This generalisa- 

 tion appears to me to have that high 

 degree of scientific evidence which is 

 derived from the concurrence of the 

 indications of history with the pro- 

 babilities derived from the constitu- 

 tion of the human mind. Nor could 

 it be easily conceived, from the mere 

 enunciation of such a proposition, 

 what a flood of light it lets in upon 

 the whole course of history, when its 

 consequences are traced, by connect- 

 ing with each of the three states 

 of human intellect which it distin- 

 guishes, and with each successive 

 modification of those three states, 

 the correlative condition of other 

 social phenomena.* 



* This great generalisation is often un- 

 favourably criticised (as by Dr. Whewell, 

 for instance) under a misapprehension of 

 its real import. The doctrine that the 

 theological explanation of piienomena be- 

 longs only to tlie infancy of our knowledge 

 of tliem, ouglit not to be construed as if it 

 WHS equivalent to tlie assertion thut man- 

 kind, as their knowledge advances, will 

 necessarily cease to believe in any kind of 

 theology. This was M. Comte's o] union ; 

 but it is by no means implied in his funda- 

 mental theorem. All that is implied is, 

 that in an advanced state of human know- 

 ledge, no other Rtiler of tL<» World will be 

 acknowledged than one who rules by uni- 

 ▼ersal laws, and does not at all, or does not 

 unless in very peculiar cases, produce 

 events by special interpositions. Origi- 

 nally all natural events were ascribed to 

 ■uch interpositions. At present every 



But whatever decision competent 

 judges may pronounce on the results 

 arrived at by any individual inquirer, 

 the method now characterised is that 

 by which the derivative laws of social 

 order and of social progress must be 

 sought. By its aid we may hereafter 

 succeed not only in looking far for- 

 ward into the future history of the 

 human race, but in determining what 

 artificial means may be used, and to 

 what extent, to accelerate the natural 

 progress in so far as it is beneficial ; 



educated person rejects tlds explanation 

 in regard to all classes of phenomena of 

 which the laws have been fully ascertained ; 

 though some have not yet reached the 

 point of referring all phenomena to the 

 idea of Law, but believe that rain and sun- 

 shine, famine and pestilence, victory and 

 defeat, death and life, are issues which the 

 I reator does not leave to the operation of 

 his general laws, but reserves to be decided 

 by express acts of volition. M. Comte's 

 theory is the neiration of this doctrine. 



Dr. Whewell equally misunderstands M. 

 Comte's doctrine respecting the second or 

 metaphysical stage of speculation. M. 

 Comte did not mean that "discussions 

 concerning ideas" are limited to an early 

 stage of inquiry, and cease when science 

 enters into the positive stage (Philosophy 

 of Discovery, p. 226 et s q.) In all M. 

 ( omte's speculations as much stress is laid 

 on the process of clearing up our concep- 

 tions as on the ascertainment of facts. 

 When M. Comte speaks of the metaphysical 

 stage of speculaiion, he means tho stage in 

 which men speak of "Nature" and other 

 abstractions as if they were active foices, 

 producing effects ; when Nature is said to 

 do this, or forbid that ; when Nature's 

 horror of a vacuum, Nature's non-admis- 

 sion of a break, Nature's vis medicatrix, 

 were offered as explanations of pheno- 

 mena; when the qualities of things were 

 mistaken for real entities dwelling in ihe 

 thinf,'s ; when the phenomena of living 

 bodies were thought to be accounted for 

 by being referred 1 o a " vital force ; " when, 

 in short, the abstract names of phenomena 

 were mi-taken for the causes of their ex- 

 ist ence. In this sense of the word it can- 

 not be reasonably denied that the meta- 

 physical explanation of phenoniena, equally 

 with the theologicid, gives way before the 

 advance of leal science. 



That the final, or positive stage, as con- 

 cfiveii by M. Com'e, has been equally 

 misunderstood, and that, notwithstanding 

 some expressions open to just criticism, M. 

 Comte never dream e 1 of denying the legi- 

 timacy of inquiry into all cau-^es which are 

 accessible to human investigation, I have 

 pointed out in a former place. 



