6iS 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



rules of conduct will only be con- 

 sidered as provisional. Being made 

 for the most numerous cases, or for 

 those of most ordinary occurrence, 

 they point out the manner in which 

 it will be least perilous to act, where 

 time or means do not exist for ana- 

 lysing the actual circumstances of 

 the case, or where we cannot trust 

 our judgment in estimating them. 

 But they do not at all supersede the 

 propriety of going through (when 

 circumstances permit) the scientific 

 process requisite for framing a rule 

 I from the data of the particular case 

 before us. At the same time, the 

 common rule may very properly serve 

 as an admonition that a certain mode 

 of action has been found by ourselves 

 and others to be well adapted to the 

 cases of most common occurrence ; 

 so that if it be unsuitable to the case 

 in hand, the reason of its being so will 

 be likely to £trise from some unusual 

 circumstance. 



§ 4. The error is therefore appa- 

 rent of those who would deduce the 

 line of conduct proper to particular 

 cases from supposed universal practi- 

 cal maxims, overlooking the neces- 

 sity of constantly referring back to the 

 principles of the speculative science, 

 in order to be sure of attaining even 

 the specific end which the rules have 

 in view. How much greater still, 

 then, must the error be of setting up 

 such unbending principles, not merely 

 as universal rules for attaining a given 

 end, but as rules of conduct generally ; 

 without regard to the possibility, not 

 only that some modifying cause may 

 prevent the attainment of the given 

 end by the means which the rule pre- 

 scribes, but that success itself may 

 conflict with some other end, which 

 may possibly chance to be more de- 

 sirable. 



This is the habitual error of many 

 of the political speculators whom I 

 have characterised as the geometrical 

 school ; especially in France, where 

 ratiocination from rules of practice 

 forms the staple commodity of jour- 



nalism and political oratory ; a mis» 

 apprehension of the functions of De- 

 duction which has brought much dis- 

 credit, in the estimation of other 

 countries, upon the spirit of genera- 

 lisation so honourably characteristic 

 of the French mind. The common- 

 places of politics, in France, are large 

 and sweeping practical maxims, from 

 which, as ultimate premises, men rea- 

 son downwards to particular appli- 

 cations, and this they call being logical 

 and consistent. For instance, they are 

 perpetually arguing that such and 

 such a measure ought to be adopted, 

 because it is a consequence of the 

 principle on which the form of govern- 

 ment is founded ; of the principle of 

 legitimacy, or the principle of the 

 sovereignty of the people. To which 

 it may be answered, that if these be 

 really practical principles, they must 

 rest on speculative grounds ; the sove- 

 reignty of the people (for example) 

 must be a right foundation for govern- 

 ment, because a government thus 

 constituted tends to produce certain 

 beneficial effects. Inasmuch, how- 

 ever, as no government produces all 

 possible beneficial effects, but all are 

 attended with more or fewer incon- 

 veniences, and since these cannot 

 usually be combated by means drawn 

 from the very causes which produce 

 them, it would be often a much H 

 stronger recommendation of some H 

 practical arrangement that it does ^ 

 not follow from what is called the 

 general principle of the government, 

 than that it does. Under a govern- 

 ment of legitimacy, the presumption 

 is far rather in favour of institutions 

 of popular origin ; and in a demo- 

 cracy, in favour of arrangements tend- 

 ing to check the impetus of popular 

 will. The line of argumentation so 

 commonly mistaken in France for 

 political philosophy tends to the prac- 

 tical conclusion that we should exert 

 our utmost efforts to aggravate, in- 

 stead of alleviating, whatever are the 

 characteristic imperfections of the 

 system of institutions which we prefer, 

 or under which we happen to live, 



