620 



LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES, 



which is e?<pressed by is or vnll he. 

 It is true that, in the largest sense 

 of the words, even these propositions 

 assert something as a matter of fact. 

 The fact affirmed in them is, that 

 the conduct recommended excites in 

 the speaker's mind the feeling of ap- 

 probation. This, however, does not 

 go to the bottom of the matter, for 

 the speaker's approbation is no suffi- 

 cient reason why other people should 

 approve ; nor ought it to be a conclu- 

 sive reason even with himself. For 

 the purposes of practice, every one 

 must be required to justify his appro- 

 bation ; and for this there is need of 

 general premises, determining what 

 are the proper objects of approbation, 

 and what the proper order of prece- 

 dence among those objects. 



These general premises, together 

 with the principal conclusions which 

 may be deduced from them, form (or 

 rather might form^ a body of doctrine, 

 which is properly the Art of Life, in 

 its three departments, Morality, Pru- 

 dence or Policy, and ^^sthetics ; the 

 Kight, the Expedient, and the Beauti- 

 ful or Noble, in human conduct and 

 works. To this art (which, in the 

 main, is unfortunately still to be 

 created) all other arts are subordi- 

 nate ; since its principles are those 

 which must determine whether the 

 special aim of any particidar art is 

 worthy and desirable, and what is its 

 place in the scale of desirable things. 

 Every art is thus a joint result of 

 laws of nature disclosed by science, 

 and of the general principles of what 

 has been called Teleology, or the 

 Doctrine of Ends ; * which, borrow- 

 ing the language of the German meta- 

 physicians, may also be termed, not 

 improperly, the principles of Practical 

 Keason. 



A scientific observer or reasoner, 

 merely as such, is not an adviser for 

 practice. His part is only to show 



* The word Teleology is also, but incon- 

 veniently and improperly, employed by 

 some writers as a name for the attempt 

 to explain the phenomena of the iiniverse 

 troia final causes. 



that certain consequences follow fr6m 

 certain causes, and that to obtain 

 certain ends, certain means are the 

 most effectual. Whether the ends 

 themselves are such as ought to be 

 pursued, and if so, in what cases and 

 to how great a length, it is no part of 

 his business as a cultivator of science 

 to decide, and science alone will 

 never qualify him for the decision. 

 In purely physical science there is 

 not much temptation to assume this 

 ulterior office ; but those who treat 

 of human nature and society invari- 

 ably claim it ; they always undertake 

 to say, not merely what is, but what 

 ought to be. To entitle them to do 

 this, a complete doctrine of Teleology 

 is indispensable. A scientific theory, 

 however perfect, of the subject-mat- 

 ter, considered merely as part of the 

 order of nature, can in no degree 

 serve as a substitute. In this respect 

 the various subordinate arts afford a 

 misleading analogy. In them there 

 is seldom any visible necessity for 

 justifying the end, since in general 

 its desirableness is denied by no- 

 body, and it is only when the 

 question of precedence is to be de- 

 cided between that end and some 

 other, that the general principles of 

 Teleology have to be called in ; but 

 a writer on Morals and Politics re- 

 quires those principles at every step. 

 The most elaborate and well-digested 

 exposition of the laws of succession 

 and co-existence among mental or 

 social phenomena, and of their rela- 

 tion to one another as causes and 

 effects, will be of no avail towards 

 the art of Life or of Society, if the 

 ends to be aimed at by that art are 

 left to the vague suggestions of the 

 intellectiis sibi permissus, or are taken 

 for granted without analysis or ques- 

 tioning. 



§ 7. There is, then, a Philosophia 

 Prima peculiar to Art, as there is one 

 which belongs to Science. There are 

 not only first principles of Knowledge, 

 but first principles of Conduct. There 

 must be some standard by which to 



