THE DOG AND THE LAW. 



559 



lay no trap. Or again, he may come as a 

 trespasser, and as such he can only recover 

 when the cause of his injuries takes the 

 form of a nuisance or is intrinsically un- 

 lawful — e.g. the setting of spring guns. In 

 each of these three cases, howe\-er, it may 

 be open to the householder to set up " No- 

 tice " as a defence, which means that he 

 must show he gave notice of the danger, 

 and that this danger was known and appre- 

 ciated to its fullest extent. 



The bare notice " Beware of the Dog " is, 

 perhaps, with one exception only, of no 

 practical value, as it serves merely to intimate 

 that a dog is kept, and does nothing to indicate 

 from what quarter danger may be expected. 



The notice, to be legally effective, must be 

 more precise. It should state, for example, 

 that a fierce dog is at large, and if after this 

 warning a person elects to run the risk, and 

 is injured in consequence, he will be held 

 to be the author of his owti hurt, upon the 

 maxim Volenti non fit injuria. (Brock v. 

 Copeland, i Esp., 203. Daly v. Arral, 24 Sc, 

 L.R. 150. Smillie v. Boyd, Sc. L.R. 148. 

 Stolt V. Wilks, 22 F. and F.). Further, the 

 notice must be fairly brought home to the 

 plaintiff, and fully understood by him. 

 Thus in Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. and P. 297, 

 the plaintiff was enabled to recover because, 

 altliough a notice was published, it was 

 proved that he was quite unable to read. 

 Again in Curtis v. Mills, 5 C. and P. 489, the 

 plaintiff was warned not to go near the 

 dog, which was tied up and insufficiently 

 secured. In this case it was held he was 

 entitled to recover if the jury were of opinion 

 that he had not himself been negligent. 



If no warning or an inadequate warning 

 is given, any person coming on lawful 

 authority or by licence will be entitled to 

 recover damages for injuries received, pro- 

 \-ided he did not know from other sources 

 the extent of the existing danger. 



As regards a trespasser by night the bare 

 notice " Beware of the Dog " will be suffi- 

 cient (Stolt V. Wilks, supra), for it is precisely 

 against this class that watch dogs are let 

 loose. But in all cases it is well to bear in 

 mind that the man who chooses to keep a 

 sa\age dog and allow him to roam at large 



is prima facie liable, and upon him rests the 

 burden of proving that the aggrieved party 

 either (i) fully appreciated the risk he was 

 running under the above maxim, or (2) 

 was a trespasser. 



With regard to the other notice referred to 

 above, viz. " Dogs will be shot," this is a 

 notice which is frequently to be seen in 

 sporting districts ; whether it is of any value 

 or not is extremely doubtful. As far as the 

 law is concerned, if it has any signiiicance 

 at all, it can only serve merel}' as a warning 

 to dog owners that if the owner or occupier 

 of the place wherein it is exhibited, or any 

 of his servants, catch a dog red-handed in the 

 act of trespassing and actually doing damage 

 to the freehold or animals thereon, he or 

 they are justified in shooting him if unable 

 otherwise to prevent his doing the damage. 

 It does not mean that stray dogs although 

 trespassing and hunting about in search of 

 game can be shot at sight. Cases on this 

 point are: Vere v. Cawdor, 1809, 11 East 568, 

 Clark V. Webster, i C. and P. 104, Corner 

 V. Champneys, 2 March, 584. " A dog," 

 said Lord Ellenborough, " does not incur 

 the penalty of death for running after a 

 hare on another man's ground." To justify 

 shooting it must be proved that the dog 

 at the time was actually in the act of killing ; 

 (Jansen v. Brown, i C. 41), and in Wells v. 

 Head, 4 C. and P. 568. Shooting was held 

 unjustifiable because, although a sheep had 

 been worried to death, the dog was running 

 away when shot, and the killing was not, 

 therefore, in the protection of property. 



It appears, however, that in ancient parks 

 and free warrens remnants of the old Forest 

 Law still survive, and in Protheroe v. 

 Matthews, 5 C. and P. 581, it was decided 

 that the owner of a park was entitled to 

 shoot dogs which were chasing deer, although 

 they were not actually chasing at the 

 moment, and it was not absolutely necessary 

 to destroy them to preserve the game. 

 Again in the case of Barrington v. Turner, 

 3 Lev., 28, the applicant's deer had trespassed 

 on land belonging to the respondent, who 

 set his dogs on to drive them back. The 

 dogs, as is their nature on such occasions, 

 exceeded their orders, and not only did they 



