THE DOG AND THE LAW. 



571 



dog." The inevitable result of such 

 treatment was that the dog, which was 

 admitted to be of a nervous disposition, 

 either jumped or was knocked overboard, 

 and was seen s\\-imnung in the sea astern 

 of the ship, and, though every effort was 

 made to recover it, was lost. 



The defendants in their defence alleged 

 that thej' had not been guilty of any negli- 

 gence, and alternatively relied on the terms 

 of the bill of lading quoted above. The 

 learned judge apparently found that the 

 letting of the dog loose was negligence on the 

 part of the defendants' servants, but he said 

 the point was of no importance, as in any 

 event, owing to the terms of the bill of lading, 

 the defendants could not be held liable, for 

 it was expressly agreed that the dog was 

 shipped on deck solelj' at shipper's risk, and 

 that the defendants were not to be liable 

 for any negligence of any of their servants, etc. 

 Dealing first with this part of the case, the 

 writer, despite the well-known ability of 

 the judge in this particular class of case 

 especially, has alwaj^s been of opinion, of 

 course with great deference, that at any rate 

 with regard to this point the judgment was 

 appealable. It was not the Collies that 

 were shipped on deck at shipper's risk, but 

 it was the Collies in a double kennel, and 

 this was so stated in the bill of lading. 

 The matter that could only be in the minds 

 of the parties at the time the agreement was 

 made is alone the matter governed by it. 

 Had the Collies, kennel and all, gone over- 

 board, the plaintiff clearly had no case, 

 even although the kennel had been knocked 

 overboard in consequence of gross negligence 

 on the part of the defendants or their 

 servants. CoUars and chains were provided 

 for the proper exercise of the dogs, and they 

 could therefore easily, for the purposes of 

 health and cleanliness, have been tied up 

 somewhere in security, even to the kennel 



itself, or been led about, and the high rate 

 charged for their conveyance seems to 

 imply that some care and trouble would be 

 taken. The plaintiff can never possibly 

 have contemplated that the ship's people 

 would be so foolish as to let his dog run 

 about loose, especially when he had pro- 

 \aded sufficient means for its proper exercise. 

 Let us suppose a person ships a number of 

 golden balls in a box to be carried on deck 

 at shipper's risk under a similar bill of 

 lading ; it is essential the balls must have 

 air, and therefore for this purpose the box 

 has affixed to it a wire-netting lid. Let us 

 further suppose some person in the employ 

 of the ship thinks it proper to turn the balls 

 loose on the deck for the purpose of airing 

 them, otherwise than by the \vire lid. 

 The balls, of course, at once roll overboard — 

 and they are not one bit more likely to do 

 this than the dog was, in the above-mentioned 

 case. Can it be said that the 'shipowTier in 

 such case is not liable ? has he not acted right 

 outside the contract altogether, and done 

 something which can never have been in 

 the contemplation of the parties at the 

 time the contract was made, and which, 

 therefore, cannot be covered by its terms ? 

 However this may be, the case quoted did 

 not go higher ; it is quite possible other 

 difficulties stood in the way, such as, for 

 instance, that further clause in the bill of 

 lading about notice of any claim having 

 to be given at the port of delivery within 

 seven days from the completion of the 

 ship's discharge, which, maybe, had not 

 been complied with. 



The shipowTier has invariably in such 

 cases more than one string to his bow, and 

 is a troublesome customer to tackle. The 

 law rightly or wrongly allows him to protect 

 himself so fully that, as has been said, as a 

 general rule dog owners will find he is best 

 left alone. 



