ANALYSIS xiii 



CHAPTER VII 



ASSIMILATION AND READJUSTMENT 



Generically, Intelligence is distinguished from Instinct as a correlation 

 of experiences and actions effected by the individual within his own 

 life-history. 2. The experience on which intelligence rests is 

 generically an experience of relations. (3) The operation of experience 

 begins with Primary Retentiveness. 4. The simplest form of the 

 inferential use of experience is Assimilation, (5) which involves a 

 modified revival. 6. The main function of experience at this stage 

 is to define general instinctive tendencies. 7. Cases in which a 

 response is not modified, but created, by close association with a 

 feeling may also be referred to assimilation. 8. For such operations 

 of experience ideas are not necessary. 9. Their results in human 

 consciousness are acquired perceptions and perceptual impulses. 

 10. Intelligence at this level is Inarticulate, n. Evidence for the 

 diffusion of this form of intelligence in the animal kingdom 



Pages 107 142 



CHAPTER VIII 



CONCRETE EXPERIENCE AND THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT 



Judgment as a synthesis of distinct elements is to be distinguished 

 from Assimilation and from the Association of Ideas. As a 

 synthesis of perceptual elements, it may be called the Practical 

 Judgment. 2. The Practical Judgment rests on the revival of 

 Concrete Experience. 3. It involves ideas. 4. The conditions of 

 revival differ from those of Association. 5. Such a synthesis is the 

 condition of the knowledge of individual objects, of memory and 

 anticipation, of purpose and desire. 6. The knowledge of objects 

 also makes possible (a) a rudimentary analogical inference, and (b) 

 the selective application of the data of experience. 7. The effect of 

 the Practical Judgment as seen in behaviour is that instead of a mere 

 modification of response the results of experience are applied to the 

 guidance of action. 8. There is thus in this stage of intelligence a 

 correlation of articulate complexes, which may be compared to the 

 logical inference from minor premiss to conclusion on the basis of a 

 perceived parallel Pages 143 173 



\ CHAPTER IX 



LEARNING AMONG THE HIGHER ANIMALS. THE METHOD OF TRIAL 



AND ERROR 



I. Acts of apparent purpose can hardly be explained by Association of 

 Ideas, but may grow up through Trial and Error. 2. Mr. Thorn- 

 dike's experiments show that many novel acts can be learnt in this 

 way. 3. But his results do not prove that all cats and dogs learn by 

 habituation. 4. Nor is it universally true that animals learn nothing 

 by being put through an action. 5. Experimental results are in the 

 main unfavourable to reflective imitation, but the preliminary ques- 

 tion should be settled whether an animal can learn by perception of 

 results affecting itself. Pages 174 185 



